

CURRENT *History*

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER 1964

CHINA IN THE WORLD TODAY

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE:

COMMUNISM AT THE CROSSROADS	<i>Milton Kovner</i>	129
COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY POTENTIAL .	<i>Ralph L. Powell</i>	136
COMMUNIST CHINA AND WESTERN EUROPE	<i>Oliver M. Lee</i>	143
CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS	<i>Werner Levi</i>	149
CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH HER ASIAN NEIGHBORS		
	<i>David P. Mozingo</i>	156
THE TWO CHINAS	<i>Paul M. A. Linebarger</i>	162
CHINA'S ECONOMY AND ITS PROSPECTS	<i>Yuan-li Wu</i>	166

REGULAR FEATURES

CURRENT DOCUMENTS • <i>Chinese Criticism of the Soviet Union</i> ..	173
BOOK REVIEWS	177
THE MONTH IN REVIEW	181

FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

CURRENT *History*

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY

The New York Times

PUBLISHED BY

Current History, Inc.

EDITOR, 1943-1955:

D. G. Redmond

SEPTEMBER, 1964

VOLUME 47

NUMBER 277

Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editors:

JOAN B. ANTELL

NEYSA S. HEBBARD

Promotion Consultant:

MARY A. MEEHAN

•

Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

SIDNEY B. FAY

Harvard University, Emeritus

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Columbia University, Emeritus

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Illinois

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

HANS KOHN

City University of New York, Emeritus

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

CARROLL QUIGLEY

Georgetown University

JOHN P. ROCHE

Brandeis University

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

HARRY R. RUDIN

Yale University

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN

Williams College

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of Southern California

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania

JOHN WUORINEN

Columbia University

Book Review Editor:

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

Coming Next Month

American Presidential Elections

In our issue for October, 1964 seven articles will review the American political scene from 1792 to the present. These articles will cover the early development of American politics, the growth of the two-party system, the dominant political personalities and trends in the 1900's and their effect on the presidential elections of this period, right up to the current 1964 campaign.

American Politics: The First Half-Century

by LOUIS W. KOENIG, Professor of Government, New York University;

The Growth of the Republican Party

by WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, Professor of History, Bucknell University;

The Wilson Years

by JAMES A. HUSTON, Professor of History, Purdue University;

The Politics of the 1920's

by WILLIAM G. CARLETON, Professor Emeritus of History and Political Science, University of Florida;

F.D.R. and the Democratic Triumph: 1932-1944

by JAMES T. PATTERSON, Assistant Professor of History, Indiana University;

Truman and Eisenhower: Their Campaigns & Administrations

by VICTOR L. ALBJERG, Professor of History, St. Norbert College;

The 1960's: The Issues and Candidates

by J. JOSEPH HUTHMACHER, Professor of History, Georgetown University.

Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, 156 Wolfpit Ave., Norwalk, Conn. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing office. Indexed in *The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, © 1964, by Current History, Inc.

85 cents a copy • \$7.75 a year • Canada \$8.00 a year • Foreign including the Philippines, \$8.50 a year
Please see inside back cover for quantity purchase rates.

NO ADVERTISING

CURRENT History

SEPTEMBER, 1964

VOL. 47, NO. 277

In this issue, seven articles explore recent developments in Communist China on the mainland and in the Republic of China on Taiwan. Our introductory author, in evaluating the much discussed Sino-Soviet dispute, points out that it "is not to be fully understood . . . in terms of . . . ideological differences and that [it] should not be allowed to obscure other currents within the Communist world of perhaps more immediate relevance and of which Peking's quarrel with Moscow is only a part."

The Sino-Soviet Dispute: Communism at the Crossroads

By MILTON KOVNER

*Lecturer on Soviet Affairs, School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University*

IF THE QUICKENING PACE of the heated and lengthy exchanges between Moscow and Peking this past year added little that was new to the existing catalog of Sino-Soviet differences, it has nevertheless revealed world communism at an even more fateful crossroad than the possible parting of ways between Russia and China. For it has catalyzed a long-smoldering restiveness in Eastern Europe into an open challenge to the traditional Soviet claim to be sole arbiter of Communist dogma and policy; and it has revealed such pretension to be a hopeless and irreconcilable anachronism in a "commonwealth" of independent and sovereign Communist states.

Under the impact of such pressures from within the Communist world, and not alone from China, Moscow has already been obliged

to renounce its "leading role" in the bloc in favor of a "voluntary union of like-minded people." What clearly remains at issue is the yet unresolved Soviet dilemma of how, with a minimum degree of coercion, it can continue to exert its discipline over the movement, to resist its centrifugal and polycentrist tendencies, and to prevent the focus of power from moving closer to Peking.

This is not to imply that there are not many widely divergent views of the revolutionary process held in Moscow and Peking. It does suggest, however, that the Sino-Soviet dispute is not to be fully understood solely in terms of these ideological differences and that they should not be allowed to obscure other currents within the Communist world of perhaps more immediate relevance and of which Peking's quarrel with Moscow is only a part.

Much of the Sino-Soviet dispute has tended to revolve around the proper Communist strategy and tactics to be pursued in the less developed countries of the world because the Chinese, for reasons of geography, racial affinity and revolutionary appeal, have regarded that area as one in which they can most effectively challenge Soviet authority. And certainly the Soviet leadership has clearly betrayed some sensitivity lest "the 'ultra left' revolutionary phraseology in which the Chinese leaders couch their adventurist concepts may find a certain response" among "immature and unstable" elements or the "politically unsophisticated."¹

In spite of the Soviet doctrinal emphasis on revolutionary struggle waged by non-military means, the positions of Moscow and Peking on the question are not so divergent as they first would seem. Contrary to Chinese charges, Soviet doctrine has never implied that the final victory either in less developed countries or elsewhere would be entirely free from conflict and war. It has rejected the "inevitability" of war because war in a nuclear age is no longer deemed an effective instrument of foreign policy and because Soviet military might ostensibly inhibits the resort to force by imperialists: but it renounces neither "just" wars of national liberation nor wars of national defense when such military action is deemed necessary. On the contrary, the period of transition to communism is still held to be one marked by extreme unrest, full of revolution and colonial war and in which armed clashes are always an imminent, if not an inevitable, possibility.

While not essentially contradicting the viewpoint of the U.S.S.R., the Chinese Communist approach is different in emphasis. The Chinese, too, maintain that they "would always prefer bringing about the transition to socialism by peaceful means,"² but they are far less sanguine about this possibility and

object to its one-sided emphasis by the U.S.S.R. "Possibility and reality, the desire and whether or not it can be fulfilled," they warn, "are two different matters." With undisguised cynicism they admit that while "in the present situation . . . it is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition . . . it would be inappropriate to over-emphasize the possibility. . . ."³ Therefore the Communist party "must prepare itself for two eventualities—while preparing for a peaceful development of the revolution, it must also fully prepare for a non-peaceful development."⁴

In this connection, the Chinese have leveled the severest criticism against Khrushchev's "parliamentary cretinism"—his suggestion at the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.⁵ in 1956 that it was possible for the working class to capture majorities in national parliaments and to transform them from "organs of bourgeois democracy" into "genuine instruments of the peoples will." While the Chinese admit that it would indeed be "wrong to refuse to utilize this legal form of struggle when necessary . . . the proletarian party must never substitute parliamentary struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the illusion that the transition to socialism can be achieved through the parliamentary road." To do so "is liable to weaken the revolutionary will of the proletariat . . . and disarm them ideologically." At any rate, for the Chinese, the whole question is at best an academic one. "To the best of our knowledge there is still not a single country where this possibility is of any practical significance."⁶

COLLABORATION WITH BOURGEOISIE

Both Moscow and Peking are inclined to recognize the leading role of the national bourgeoisie at least in the first or "democratic" stage of the revolution, provided that such governments adopt a neutralist foreign policy with a strong anti-imperialist slant. While the Soviet leadership accedes to the more skeptical Chinese view that such leaders are fickle and inclined to compromise with the West, it nonetheless maintains that "the

¹ *Pravda*, April 3, 1964, p. 4.

² *Peking Review*, No. 30 (July 26, 1963), p. 5.

³ *Peking Review*, No. 14 (April 3, 1964), p. 22.

⁴ *Peking Review*, No. 30 (July 26, 1963), p. 16.

⁵ Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

⁶ *Peking Review*, No. 14 (April 3, 1964), pp. 14, 22.

numerous instances of inconsistency and vacillation by the national bourgeoisie do not furnish grounds for the conclusion that it is incapable of taking part in the national-revolutionary movement."⁷

Within the context of this more "creative" approach to the national liberation movement, differences in ideology, outlook and social systems need not impede the development of friendly state-to-state relations with such governments; even Nasser's overt anti-communism may be tolerated in the hope that he, with Soviet assistance, will do more damage to Western influence in the Near East and Africa in the name of anticolonialism and Arab nationalism than the U.S.S.R. could hope to achieve alone.

For the Chinese, however, the Communist party must at all times draw a clear line of demarcation between itself and the national bourgeoisie. It must maintain its ideological, political and organizational independence and, what is crucial, the Party must insist on the leadership of the revolution. Communist China's own bitter experience in collaborating with the Kuomintang in the 1920's is offered as evidence that unless indigenous Communists, from the very outset, assume militant leadership of national revolutionary movements, the fruits of revolution will ultimately be appropriated by the imperialist world with whom the bourgeoisie in the new countries still retain strong financial and other ties. They say:

Our views are perfectly clear. In the national liberation movement it is necessary both to insist on leadership of the proletariat and to establish a broad anti-imperialist united front.⁸

In the broader perspectives of Soviet strategy, however, the Chinese dictum of "alliance and struggle" for less developed countries is not to be read in one breath: the former is a prerequisite and a necessary precondition for the latter. Couched in the kind of conservatism which has elicited the most violent Chi-

nese objections, the Soviets have repeatedly cautioned that "to advance a slogan for an armed uprising, when there is no revolutionary situation in the country, means to doom the working class to defeat."⁹ Since the legacy of economic backwardness inherited by many of these countries from their former colonial masters has resulted in either no proletariat at all or in a proletariat weak in numbers and political organization, they emphasize that at present

the task of the working class lies not in securing a leading role for itself, since it is not yet prepared for this, but in winning over allies and in rallying all the people around itself. Only after this can it become the leader. . . .¹⁰

Chinese calls for the establishment of "peoples' democracies" in less developed countries have evoked strong Soviet warnings that if the Chinese mean a "dictatorship of the proletariat" they are calling for premature revolution by "leaping over uncompleted stages" and thereby causing "a break in the united front of the national liberation movement"—a movement based on united action with bourgeois and other non-proletarian elements. Moreover, they ask:

Who, pray, would heed the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat in those countries where there is no proletariat and no proletarian party? And what kind of dictatorship of the proletariat can there be without a proletariat?¹¹

"NATIONAL DEMOCRACY"

That the Soviet leadership still envisages the cooperation between Socialist and non-Communist regimes in less developed areas as a lengthy process is reflected in its steadfast insistence that a "national democracy," and not a full-fledged "peoples' democracy," is the most immediate prospect for most less developed countries traversing the road to socialism. Designed, apparently, to forestall Communist Chinese attempts to accelerate the tempo of revolutionary transformations in these countries "prematurely," Moscow's concept of a national democratic government is to comprise a "national front," a ruling coalition embracing elements of the working class, the peasantry—and the national bourgeoisie.

⁷ *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 12 (December, 1963), pp. 47, 48.

⁸ *Peking Review*, No. 43 (Oct. 25, 1963), p. 11.

⁹ *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Azia i Afrika Segodnya*, No. 7 (July, 1963), p. 4.

¹¹ *Kommunist*, No. 11 (July, 1963), p. 25.

This more gradualist formula for the transition of underdeveloped countries to a non-capitalist path of economic development was invented by the U.S.S.R. largely with Cuba in mind. However, Castro's excessive revolutionary zeal and his haste to proceed to a socialist stage led to Cuba's evident rejection of the formula and to Moscow's reluctant acknowledgement of the regime as in the process of "building socialism."¹² Castro's self-proclaimed adherence to the Communist community of nations and his increasing dependence on the U.S.S.R. for economic and military support may have proved to be a mixed blessing for Moscow. The victory of communism in Cuba, paradoxically, may have impelled Moscow's repeated admonitions against precipitate haste to those seeking more immediate establishment of Communist regimes in countries where the "objective conditions"—and by implication Soviet resources—are not yet adequate for such transformations.

SINO-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS

It is not easy to disentangle the impact of the dispute on Sino-Soviet economic relations. Both the Russians and the Chinese have

accused each other of extending an inter-party ideological dispute to interstate relations, particularly to trade relations. What is clear, however, is that Sino-Soviet trade has declined precipitously in recent years. In 1959 such trade amounted to more than \$2 billion; by 1962 the level of such trade had dwindled to \$750 million; and this year it is unlikely to exceed \$500 million.¹³ Moreover, the value of Soviet deliveries of complete plants and equipment, hitherto China's principal source for its industrialization program, has declined by more than forty times since 1959.

Soviet sources charge that this reduction in trade took place "on the initiative of the Chinese leaders . . . disregarding the damage caused by such actions to the Chinese economy."¹⁴ With equal force the Chinese contend that it was the Soviet decision in July, 1960, to withdraw its more than 1,300 technicians in China and "to scrap the hundreds of agreements and contracts it had signed" which

inflicted incalculable difficulties and losses on China's economy . . . and was the main reason for the reduction in the economic and commercial links between China and the Soviet Union. China is the victim. Yet the . . . C.P.S.U. blames China for reducing economic and commercial links with the Soviet Union and for extending ideological differences to the sphere of state relations. So complete a reversal of the truth is indeed astonishing.¹⁵

The full extent of Soviet economic assistance to Communist China is equally ambiguous. The U.S.S.R. claims to have extended to China more than \$2 billion in long-term credits,¹⁶ and to have helped China in the construction of over 200 large industrial enterprises for which it supplied the services of more than 10,000 Soviet technicians and provided "virtually free" over 24,000 sets of blueprints. They say, "we speak about all this not to brag but only because the leaders of the C.P.C.¹⁷ are striving of late to belittle the significance of Soviet aid."¹⁸

If, however, one accepts the Chinese summary of Soviet economic aid, then indeed, Soviet "largesse" has been niggardly.

¹² To date, no "national democratic" states have as yet been recognized as such, although Soviet spokesmen have consistently pointed to Guinea, Ghana, and Mali as the most promising candidates. Cuba's course was subsequently approved by a significant modification of the doctrine to suggest that national democracy need not be an *inevitable* stage in the transition to socialism: "for some countries the general-democratic stage can be very short or in general not obligatory. . . . However, due to radical transformations of society at the general-democratic stage, the transition from national democracy to the socialist state will be shorter and easier than from the most liberal bourgeois democracy." *Kommunist*, No. 13 (Sept., 1962), p. 109.

¹³ *The New York Times*, June 7, 1964, p. 14.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, p. 1.

¹⁵ *Peking Review*, No. 30 (July 26, 1963), p. 28.

¹⁶ Previously, publicly announced credits have totalled less than \$800 million. The higher figure released by the U.S.S.R. is undoubtedly inflated by a variety of opaque transactions involving Soviet military assistance during the Korean war, cession to China of Soviet military bases and other facilities, and the transfer of Soviet shares in jointly owned enterprises.

¹⁷ Communist Party of China.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, p. 1.

In recent years, the leaders of the C.P.S.U. have habitually played the benefactor and frequently boasted of their disinterested assistance. . . . Far from being gratis, Soviet aid to China was rendered mainly in the form of trade. . . . China has paid and is paying the Soviet Union in goods, gold, or convertible foreign exchange for all Soviet-supplied . . . goods, including those made available on credit plus interest. It is necessary to add that the prices of many of the goods imported from the Soviet Union were much higher than those on the world market.¹⁹

Moreover, the Chinese have pointed out that most of Soviet long-term credits were used for the purchase of military equipment employed in the Korean War in which China "made great sacrifices and incurred vast military expenses." Thus "even the war material supplied to China in the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea has not been given gratis."²⁰

AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The parsimony of the Soviet response to China's aid requirements has been in marked contrast to its sizable aid commitments in non-Communist less developed countries; and not surprisingly, it has evoked sharp Chinese objections to the whole direction and motivation of the Soviet lending program. While the Chinese interpose no serious objections to military and economic aid which helps newly emergent peoples to secure and consolidate their national independence, they insist that the national liberation struggle still finds its "most concentrated expression" in armed struggle and "in no case can it be said that national independence and social progress are due solely to the economic aid they received from the socialist countries and not mainly to the revolutionary struggles of their own peoples."²¹ Indeed, indiscriminate "bloc" economic and military assistance to the bourgeois leadership, they maintain, only serves to help consolidate the positions of the middle class and make necessary another and more protracted armed struggle.

¹⁹ *Peking Review*, No. 9 (May 8, 1964), p. 13.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²¹ *Peking Review*, No. 43 (Oct. 25, 1963), p. 8.

²² *Peking Review*, No. 51 (December 20, 1963), p. 13.

²³ *Peking Review*, No. 39 (Sept. 27, 1963), p. 10.

Moreover, the Chinese claim that "the policy and purposes of the leaders of the C.P.S.U. in their aid to newly independent countries in recent years are open to suspicion." They particularly resent Soviet aid to India, where, apart from "vigorous political support," the U.S.S.R. has given India "active economic and military aid to oppose China," particularly "after the Indian reactionaries unleashed a large scale assault on China in October, 1962." "The sole purpose of a socialist country in aiding newly independent countries," the Chinese maintain, "is to help them develop independent national economies and free themselves from imperialist control—it is definitely not to help them oppose another socialist country."

Unquestionably, Chinese criticisms of the Soviet aid program in developing countries are based partly on the argument that the U.S.S.R. has treated non-bloc nations more generously than it has its own more deserving Communist allies. China has pointedly reminded the Soviet Union of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 which affirmed that "fraternal mutual aid is part and parcel" of the relations among socialist countries, and that "this aid is a striking expression of socialist internationalism." Peking accuses Moscow with having

liquidated the proletarian internationalist relations of mutual assistance and cooperation among socialist countries and put the fraternal socialist countries on par with the capitalist countries. This amounts to liquidating the socialist camp.²²

CHINA AND THE BLOC

With any further economic assistance from the U.S.S.R. unlikely under present circumstances, the Chinese have made a virtue out of necessity and have extolled the advantages of "self-reliance." Every country, they now maintain, "must firmly follow the line of relying mainly on its own efforts in national construction and rapidly develop its economy by depending on the labor and wisdom of its own people and fully utilizing its own resources."²³ Economic independence, they warn, is the foundation of political independence. Economic subordination, on the

other hand, will inevitably result in political subordination.

In response, the U.S.S.R. has declared that the Chinese formula for "the construction of socialism mainly by its own forces would, in its direct meaning, give rise to no objections," and that it would indeed be an erroneous interpretation of proletarian internationalism to think "that the people of some country may sit with folded arms and rely exclusively on the assistance of other countries of socialism."²⁴ But they argue

is there truly a problem, and a controversial one at that, about whether each country should rely on its own resources in the building of socialism? There is no such problem. Why then have the Chinese leaders invented it and why do they offer it as a subject of debate?²⁵

For Moscow the answer is clear enough. The Chinese doctrine of "go it alone" is meant to strike hard at Soviet efforts to bind the bloc more closely to Soviet purposes. Khrushchev has long sought to invest the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) with new dimension and greater depth; and he has urged a supranational planning authority to coordinate Communist economies not only on the level of trade but also at the level of output. Moscow opposes the Chinese formula because "it conceals the concept of creating self-sufficient national economies for which the economic contacts with other countries are restricted to trade only." What is worse, "the Chinese comrades are trying to impose this approach on other socialist countries too. . . . This policy . . . cannot be regarded otherwise than as an attempt to undermine the unity of the Communist commonwealth."²⁶

SOVIET DOMINANCE

China, on the other hand—and it is not alone among the Communist countries—has seen in this Soviet scheme a device to enhance Soviet economic predominance at the expense of the already limited economic sovereignty

of the individual member states. It has charged that under the guise of the division of labor among the socialist countries

You infringe the independence and sovereignty of fraternal countries and oppose their efforts to develop their economy on an independent basis in accordance with their own needs and potentialities. You bully those fraternal countries whose economies are less advanced . . . and try to force them to remain agricultural countries and serve as your sources of raw materials and outlets for your goods. You bully fraternal countries which are industrially more developed and insist that they stop manufacturing their traditional products and become accessory factories serving your industries.

We hold that it is necessary to transform the present Council of Mutual Economic Assistance . . . which is now solely controlled by the leaders of the C.P.S.U., into one based on genuine equality and mutual benefit which the fraternal countries of the socialist camp may join of their own free will.²⁷

A related question has been the significant, although little publicized, controversy over the timetable for the transition to communism by the various bloc countries. In an apparent concession to strong Chinese objections, Khrushchev in 1959 revised an earlier formulation that bloc states would enter Communism in two stages—first the more economically advanced Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) countries and somewhat later the less developed Asian socialist states—by announcing that all bloc countries would reach Communism "more or less simultaneously." Mao Tse-tung eagerly took the new doctrine at its face value and interpreted it to mean that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to "freeze" its present standard of living, or indeed even to reduce it, in order to transfer to lesser developed bloc states the resources necessary to enable them to catch up with the U.S.S.R.

Moscow was visibly disturbed, however, by the political intent of the Chinese "great leap" policy which they interpreted as "obviously conceived as an attempt to catch up to all the socialist countries and 'in one jump' to seize a dominant position in the world socialist system."²⁸ Khrushchev has subsequently indicated that the U.S.S.R. has no intention of retarding its own economic de-

²⁴ *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, p. 4.

²⁵ *Pravda*, April 28, 1964, p. 6.

²⁶ *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, p. 4.

²⁷ *Peking Review*, No. 19 (May 8, 1964), p. 15.

²⁸ *Pravda*, April 3, 1964, p. 7.

velopment to help that of other socialist countries, particularly those engaged in heretical economic and social experiments: "It would be strange, to say the least, if the Soviet Union, having completed the building of socialism ahead of the other countries, were to wait for the levelling up of the general economic development of the socialist countries before starting on the construction of Communism."²⁹ With undisguised candor it has reminded China that its current demands for equal status in the bloc are "diametrically opposed" to its previous "parasitical" interpretation of the principles of proletarian internationalism:

Not so long ago they were saying that more economically developed countries should pass on to backward countries the entire part of their national income which exceeds the level of the backward countries. . . . The demand that socialist countries who have advanced should hold back their development has nothing in common with internationalism and genuine concern with the development of world socialism.³⁰

Khrushchev has thus modified the doctrine of simultaneous transition to allow for different deadlines within "one historic epoch" and has posited for COMECON the more limited objective of "narrowing the gulf" between its economically-backward and more-advanced members. However, the price for China's admission has been progressively increased. China cannot find a place in the emerging economic union without retarding the rest of the members: and the price for membership would place it among the less developed Communist countries—a status which for some time would mean a position of political inferiority vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.

EASTERN EUROPE IN THE BALANCE

Rumania, which in recent years has sought

to steer a middle course between East and West has also undertaken the role of honest broker in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Its concern for Communist unity, however, is in fact an overriding concern for its own national interests and it is not surprising that it, among others in Eastern Europe, has eagerly seized the opportunity provided by the Sino-Soviet dispute to assert itself.

Rumania, along with other less developed members of the bloc, has long objected to Khrushchev's ambitious proposals for the creation of a central supranational authority within COMECON that would ensure co-ordination of national economic plans and allocate raw materials and investment among member nations. Proud of its record of industrial growth (the most impressive in Eastern Europe), Rumania fears that the Soviet proposals to cut back on its plans for building up certain industries regarded by Moscow as inefficient or redundant to bloc-wide needs would condemn Rumania to remain a supplier of raw materials to other more advanced Communist countries and inhibit its increasing trade ties with the West. Chinese objections to Khrushchev's "grand design" for COMECON—which they have characterized as a new form of colonialism—could not have failed to strike a responsive chord in Bucharest.³¹

In an unequivocal declaration of independence by the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist party in the April 26, 1964, issue of its newspaper, *Scinteia*, it maintained that there can be "no unique patterns and recipes" given the "diversity of conditions of building socialism." The statement denied that there are "superior" parties
(Continued on page 179)

Milton Kovner is well-known to readers of *Current History*. Since 1952, he has served the U. S. Government in various capacities as a specialist on the U.S.S.R. and, in 1962, he was a Research Associate with the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. He is the author of *The Challenge of Coexistence* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961).

²⁹ *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 10.

³⁰ *Pravda*, May 7, 1964, p. 4.

³¹ The Rumanians have proposed that membership in COMECON be expanded to include Communist China and the participation of other non-Communist less developed countries that are proceeding on "a path of non-capitalist development." Such new members in COMECON would increase the number of less developed countries in the organization whose interests would presumably parallel those of Rumania.

After presenting a rather awesome picture of Communist Chinese military might, especially in sheer numbers, this specialist points out that "Despite their recognized power, the armed forces of Communist China suffer from a number of important weaknesses. . . ." China's basic military weakness, he continues, is "that it has no nuclear capability" and that "it is not even fully self-sufficient in terms of production of conventional weapons."

Communist China's Military Potential

By RALPH L. POWELL

School of International Service, American University

THE IMMENSE armed forces of Communist China are collectively designated as the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.). In several important respects, this large military establishment is similar to the conventional forces of the Western powers. It has the traditional missions of national defense and support of the government's foreign policies.¹ In terms of organization and equipment it resembles the powerful Western forces of World War II or of the Korean War. Nevertheless, there are striking differences. The revolutionary Red Army, the predecessor of the current armed services of Communist China, was a party army. It was organized by the Communist party and its loyalty was primarily to the Party, rather than to the Chinese state. Even today, the armed forces are essentially an instrument of the Party dictatorship. They are not national forces, in the sense that the armed services of the United States represent the state and the government, rather than the political party running the administration at any particular time.

Furthermore, the Chinese Communist

armed forces have undertaken several important missions that are not characteristic of Western armies, and that vary considerably even from those of the Soviet fighting forces. Red China's armed services also function as a massive labor force, used to support the economic projects of the Party. They are employed as a media of mass indoctrination, not only to instill political loyalty among the troops, but also to help indoctrinate the masses. In the past, the Army was used as a training school for administrative cadres and now it trains technicians valuable to the semi-developed economy. It is still considered an excellent training center for young Party members. Finally, the armed forces are still the major security force supporting the Party's dictatorship. Thus, they are a vast gendarmerie, whose major mission is to preserve the Party against its enemies, foreign or domestic. Hence "the P.L.A. is a tool for political struggle."²

Naturally, the Party places unusual emphasis on maintaining the loyalty and indoctrination of these vital armed forces. Twenty-five years ago, Mao Tse-tung laid down a basic concept when he stated that "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun will never be allowed to command the Party." Therefore, the Party maintains a complex and penetrating political apparatus within the P.L.A., seeking to preserve the

¹ See *Kung-tso T'ung hsün* (Work Correspondence), No. 3, Jan. 7, 1961. A valuable collection of now declassified secret journals of the General Political Department of the Chinese Communist armed forces. They include 29 issues dated Jan. 1 to Aug. 26, 1961 (hereafter referred to as K.T.T.H.).

² Radio Peking, Domestic, Feb. 8, 1964.

Party's absolute leadership in the armed forces.

The control mechanism by which the Party maintains its dictatorship over the P.L.A. extends from the Politburo down through the military and Party chains-of-command to the basic units of the armed forces. The key institution in the hierarchy is the powerful Military Affairs Committee of the Party (M.A.C.). It is responsible to the Politburo not only for the indoctrination and loyalty of the military services but also for their administration, logistics, strategy and even combat operations. The marshals and generals who constitute the Committee are senior party-soldiers. As a committee, they supervise the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff, the general departments of the P.L.A. and the major commands of the armed forces.³

Beneath the M.A.C. the control apparatus consists of party committees, political departments, political officers or commissars and members of the Party and its Youth Corps. Under a system of collective leadership, dominant party committees extend from the M.A.C. down to the company level. Both

the military commanders and the political officers are subordinate to their respective over-all committees. Political departments reach down from the General Political Department in Peking to the regimental level. Political officers serve even at the company unit level. It is the Party's objective to have a Party member in each squad and on the crew of each tank, gun, and aircraft. During the year ending in April, 1961, almost one-tenth of the personnel of the P.L.A. were taken into the Party as new members and, early in 1961, the M.A.C. called for recruiting about 65 per cent of the young soldiers into the Youth Corps.⁴ Apparently almost all officers, most non-commissioned officers and many enlisted men are Party members. It has been estimated that one-third of the armed forces are members of the Party.

THE MILITARY SERVICES

The armed services (P.L.A.) are a massive, unified force consisting of ground, air, naval and military public security elements. As of the fall of 1960, the P.L.A. had a strength of about 2,700,000.⁵ The Army is still the dominant service and, including the public security troops, it is the biggest land force in the world, consisting of some 2.5 million men. In time of war, large field armies can be created, but in peacetime the largest organized unit is the *chün* (army). There are reported to be 30 to 35 such armies. Since a Chinese army normally consists of three divisions and of 50,000 to 60,000 men, it is similar to our corps.⁶ Estimates vary considerably, but it is probable that there are at least 115 infantry divisions, plus two or three armored, one or two airborne, some artillery and cavalry divisions, as well as supporting troops. The organization of infantry divisions, like that of the armies, is triangular, consisting of three infantry regiments, plus supporting units.⁷

The Army is still essentially an infantry organization, but it is a much more complex and better equipped force than it was at its entry into the Korean War, when it forced the United Nations forces into an early retreat.

From 1950 to 1960, with extensive Soviet

³ See Ralph L. Powell, *Politico-Military Relations in Communist China*, Policy Research Study, External Research Staff, Dept. of State, Washington, D. C., 1963, pp. 5-7 and, by the same author, "The Military Affairs Committee and Party Control of the Military in China," *Asian Survey*, July, 1963, pp. 347-356.

⁴ See Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 8-11; S. M. Chiu, "Political Control in the Chinese Communist Army," *Military Review*, Aug., 1961, pp. 25-28.

⁵ K.T.T.H., No. 1, Jan. 1, 1961. Cf., *The New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1960, p. 28.

⁶ See *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, 1962-1963, p. 8; *The Military Balance*, 1962-1963, p. 8, and *The Military Balance*, 1963-1964, Nov. 1963, p. 9, both published by the Institute for Strategic Studies, London; Allen S. Names, "Communist China's Armed Forces," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Vol. 1, No. 16, Oct. 25, 1961, p. 1.

⁷ *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, 1962-1963, p. 8; *The Military Balance* 1963-1964, p. 9; Takashi Oka, "The Face of Red China," *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 21, 1964. During recent years estimates of the total numbers of Chinese divisions have varied from 120 to 160. In addition to the above references, see Edgar O'Ballance, *The Red Army of China* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 201, and Conway J. Smith, "Red China's Military Revolution," *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 45 (April, 1961), p. 22. Both of the latter report 150 or more divisions.

assistance, the P.L.A. underwent steady reorganization and reequipment. By 1960, the regular Army resembled the powerful and complex World War II armies of the Western powers. Staff and specialized units had been developed. Besides the basic arms, today there are anti-aircraft, chemical warfare, communication, engineer, parachute and transportation units. Logistics have been improved; considerable standardization of equipment has taken place; firepower has been increased. Large amounts of modern, although not the latest, Soviet equipment have been provided. Communist China's own industries are capable of producing small and light arms in quantity. Motor vehicles are manufactured in limited numbers. One source credits Peking with the ability to produce Russian-designed heavy mortars, artillery up to 152MM guns, and some T-34 medium tanks.

In 1960, the Air Force was a modernized organization, considered to be the fourth largest in the world. Since then, it has declined in strength owing to a lack of spare parts and of replacement aircraft. Recent estimates of the personnel strength of the Air Force vary from 75,000 to 90,000. Operational aircraft are believed to number 2,300 to 2,400. Of these 1,700 to 2,000 are jet aircraft, of which the majority are obsolescent MIG 15 and MIG 17 fighters. There are

also a small number of supersonic Soviet MIG 19's and probably still 300 or more outdated IL 28 light jet bombers.⁸

As of late 1962, Red China was credited with building trainers, MIG 15's and probably MIG 17's, but there was some disagreement as to whether the planes were fully manufactured in China or were merely assembled there, some of the parts being provided by the Soviet Union.⁹ Despite the fact that Khrushchev has provided some high performance MIG 21 fighters to Nasser, Sukarno, and even to Nehru, there is no evidence that these advanced aircraft have been given to his legal ally, Communist China.¹⁰

Communist China has an air defense network consisting of numerous strategically placed military airbases, anti-aircraft artillery, a radar net reported to extend from Manchuria to Hainan Island, and probably a few ground-to-air missile sites. Anti-aircraft weapons include, at least, 37MM and 85MM guns and two types of heavy machine guns.¹¹

The Navy is the weakest of the armed services and its main value to the regime lies in its limited coastal defense capability. However, the principal offensive force consists of some 30 submarines, of which half are Soviet W Class boats, with a long operational range. Otherwise, the Navy possesses only four destroyers, some frigates, motor torpedo boats, gunboats, patrol craft and a number of amphibious ships.¹² Disagreement exists as to whether or not the naval service includes a Marine Corps, but it does have a small air arm.

THE MILITIA

The major auxiliary to the regular armed services is the "people's militia." The development of a revolutionary mass militia has long been an integral part of Mao Tse-tung's military doctrine. During the frantic "great leap" period, the militia was vastly expanded. Under the Maoist slogan, "everyone a soldier" 200 million men and even women were recruited, on paper at least, into a gigantic militia system. The objectives were more political and economic than they were military, for military organization and discipline

⁸ Seymour Topping, "Chinese Cut Back on Air Operations," *The New York Times*, Mar. 1, 1964, p. 18; Oka, *op. cit.*; *The Military Balance 1963-1964*, p. 10.

⁹ Compare *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, p. 8, and Leonard Bridgeman, ed., *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* (London: Trade Press, 1963), p. 33.

¹⁰ Wing Cmdr. Asher Lee, "The Russian and Chinese Air Forces," Ch. 12 in *Brassey's Annual; The Armed Forces Year-Book, 1963*, (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 99.

¹¹ *K.T.T.H.*, No. 12, March 10, 1961; Robert Rigg, "Red Army in Retreat," *Current History*, Jan., 1957, p. 4; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 26; *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, p. 8; Topping, *op. cit.*, p. 18; Oka, *op. cit.*, believes that Red China probably does not possess ground-to-air missiles, but their shooting down of Chinese Nationalist U-2 aircraft could indicate that they do.

¹² *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1963-64*, London, Trade Press, 1963, p. 51; Oka, *op. cit.*; *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances*, p. 8; *The Military Balance*, p. 10; Rigg, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

were utilized to mobilize the masses for production. But the basic or core elements of the militia were to provide an inexhaustible supply of military reserves for the P.L.A. Also the massive militia was meant to play an important role in plans for a non-atomic, "people's war" defense against a possible nuclear attack.¹³

However, like the ill-fated economic "great leap" and the communes, the "everyone a soldier" campaign largely collapsed. By 1960-1961, official reports indicated that the militia was in even worse condition than Western analysts had suspected. Many units did not actually exist and numerous individuals did not even know whether or not they belonged to the militia. Existing organizations suffered from serious political and structural weaknesses. The Chief of the General Staff stated that it would be necessary to rebuild from the ground up. The worried M.A.C. ordered that units be placed under reliable Party members and that weapons be issued only to trusted militia members. It is obvious that as of 1961 the vaunted mass militia added relatively little to the military capabilities of Communist China.

MILITARY ASSETS

Among the greatest strengths of the armed forces are certain characteristics of their personnel. There is no group of military commanders in the world who have had as much combat experience as have the senior officers of the P.L.A. Some of them have spent more than 20 years in insurrectionary and conventional warfare. They are masters of guerrilla and mobile war. Also, many of them gained experience in modern conventional combat during the Korean War. The younger officers

are products of a modernized, more professional force and have been trained in a hierarchy of basic and advanced military schools, which were established with the assistance of Soviet military advisers.¹⁴

Most of the enlisted men still come from the peasantry. They possess good common sense, are physically tough, and capable of enduring great hardships. Despite China's numerous defeats during the last century, qualified military observers have long maintained that when well fed, trained, equipped and led, the Chinese peasant is a first-class soldier.¹⁵ The Party has sought with considerable success to raise the status, prestige, and qualifications of military personnel. This tends to improve morale. Furthermore, the Communist regime has a vast manpower pool from which to draft new recruits. It has been estimated that as of July 1, 1964, there were 140,400,000 males of military age in China. Fortunately this staggering figure has very little relationship to the number of men that poverty-stricken China can maintain under arms. Low economic productivity, relatively poor standards of health and the demands for political reliability vastly reduce the number that can be effectively mobilized for military service.

Yet, since only 700,000 men or less are drafted each year, the regime can be highly selective in its recruiting. Conscripts are better educated than in the past and have been intensively indoctrinated. Basic literacy has replaced illiteracy as a general characteristic of the Chinese soldier. Even some intellectuals have been drafted for technical units and the campaign to transfer educated urban youths to the countryside will permit the drafting of more young men with a secondary school education.

The Party appears to be more satisfied with the loyalty and effectiveness of the armed forces than it was a few years ago. Even during the internal crisis in 1961 the M.A.C. reported that most of the personnel were well-indoctrinated and politically reliable. By September, 1962, the Tenth Plenum of the Party's Central Committee commended the reliability and strength of the military forces

¹³ Ralph L. Powell, "Everyone a Soldier," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct., 1960, pp. 100-111.

¹⁴ Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Red Army: Growth of Professionalism and Party-Army Relations, 1949-1963," Draft, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1963, pp. 7-9, 15-20; *Communist China: Ruthless Enemy or Paper Tiger*, Wash., D. C., Dept. of Army, Pam. 20-61, Appendix G; S. M. Chiu, "Chinese Communist Military Leadership," *Military Review*, March, 1960, pp. 59-66.

¹⁵ See Ralph L. Powell, *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1955), pp. 105, 208, 226-7, and 234.

and recently an indoctrination campaign has called on the whole country to learn from the P.L.A., especially in political-ideological work.¹⁶

During the last decade the reorganization, modernization and technical training of the P.L.A. as well as the extensive improvement and relative standardization of equipment, have greatly strengthened the armed forces, which already constituted a formidable foe during the Korean War. In the attack on India in the fall of 1962, the Chinese units involved demonstrated real professional competence.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the greatest strength of the P.L.A. still lies in its massive size. Its very numbers give military prestige to the regime and tend to impress and to frighten China's smaller neighbors. Thus the armed forces are capable of being employed for either military or psychological aggression.

WEAKNESSES OF THE P.L.A.

Despite their recognized power, the armed forces of Communist China suffer from a number of important weaknesses, several of which are fundamental and will be extremely difficult to rectify. The basic military weakness of Red China consists of the fact that it has no nuclear capability; furthermore, it is not even fully self-sufficient in terms of production of conventional weapons. Also, the crisis of recent years demonstrated that to a dangerous degree the morale and loyalty of the armed forces depend on the economic conditions and welfare of the populace, from which the troops come.

¹⁶ *K.T.T.H.*, No. 24, June 18, 1961; *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People Daily) Feb. 1, 1964, Editorial; Radio Peking, Domestic, Feb. 12, 1964, and Feb. 19, 1964.

¹⁷ See Gen. K. S. Thimayya, "Chinese Aggression and After," *International Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 5; Brig. W. F. K. Thompson, "When Two Empires Meet," *Survival* (London), Vol. 5, No. 2 (March-April, 1963), pp. 78-82.

¹⁸ Statement of Sec. of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee, Jan. 27, 1964.

¹⁹ See Alice H. Hsieh, *Communist China and Nuclear Force* [P-2719-1] (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp., 1963), pp. 2-4.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1963, p. 1.

²¹ *Ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 1, and May 18, 1964, p. 2.

In this age of thermonuclear bombs and missiles, no state can be classed as a really great military power unless it has developed a nuclear capability that provides an effective striking force and a convincing deterrent. The leaders of Communist China maintain that they will develop atomic weapons. They are opposed to the nuclear test ban treaty, and they state that in the future their forces will be armed with atomic weapons. Hence, despite grave internal problems, they are still persistently diverting scarce resources to a nuclear arms program.¹⁸ From 1958 to 1960, Party leaders were optimistic regarding the rapidity with which they could create atomic arms.¹⁹ But Peking has declared, and Moscow has not denied, that in June, 1959, the U.S.S.R. unilaterally abrogated a 1957 agreement on "new technology for national defense" and "refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture." In the fall of 1963, the foreign minister stated that China could not detonate an atomic bomb for several years.²⁰ In December, he was quoted as saying that it might be 10 to 20 years before China could "solve the technical problems involved" in manufacturing atomic weapons. More recently, he and the Premier have been even less specific regarding the timing of an atomic explosion,²¹ for Communist China's ability to produce nuclear weapons and delivery systems has been seriously delayed by the failure of the "great leap," economic depression, and the withdrawal of Soviet assistance.

Nevertheless, sometime during the next few years Red China should succeed in exploding an original atomic device. That first blast will have no immediate military significance, for there is a tremendous difference in terms of time, resources and funds between the detonation of a crude device and the creation of a nuclear stockpile. Yet, the initial atomic explosion will certainly have very important political and psychological repercussions. It will frighten our Asian friends and allies. Certainly Radio Peking will seek every possible psychological benefit. It can be expected to exploit every theme from claims of self-

defense to varying degrees of atomic blackmail. Fortunately for the temporary peace of the world, the time involved in the development of atomic weapons by highly industrialized Britain and France indicates that it will probably be impossible for semi-industrialized China to create more than a minimal nuclear stockpile during the next decade.

LACK OF SOVIET AID

The lack of any atomic capability is not the only military problem confronting Peking. The P.L.A. actually has less over-all conventional military capabilities than it had in 1960. Much of its most advanced equipment was supplied by the Soviet Union prior to mid-1960, and it is authoritatively reported that the U.S.S.R. has ceased to supply both new weapons and spare parts.²² The air force has been the hardest hit. Its jet aircraft are obsolescent; the inventory of planes has actually decreased; and there have been reports of planes being cannibalized to maintain others. Also, fuel shortages have seriously reduced pilot training, and even during the 1958 offshore islands crisis the P.L.A. pilots already could not match those of Nationalist China.

The Navy is also being damaged by the lack of Soviet aid. This should be especially true of its submarines. Heavy army equipment will deteriorate less rapidly than aircraft or complex naval equipment, but even the army suffers.

As of 1961, the Chinese Army already had many of the problems characteristic of conscript armies and there had been a decline in the combat readiness of the P.L.A. The efficiency of vital military communications had decreased and the national transportation system was inadequate. In 1963, artillery and ammunition were reported to be in short supply; China's industries cannot manufacture all of the necessary types of modern army equipment.²³ Some of these conditions have

been improved by reforms carried out by the M.A.C., but others require long-term advances in the educational and industrial systems.

There is very serious doubt that problem-ridden Communist China can create a really modern jet aircraft or missile industry before its air force becomes obsolete. Thus, there may be an interim period when, as in the past, the People's Liberation Army will be in fact only an army, without effective air and naval services. Red China is declining as an air power and it was never classed as a naval power.


INTERNAL SECURITY

There are also internal security problems. One of the most interesting revelations of the *Work Correspondence* documents was the surprising degree to which the morale and political loyalty of the armed forces depends on the welfare and morale of the populace. It had been assumed that Party control of all means of communications, plus security measures and preferential treatment of the military, would preserve the loyalty of the military services in a time of internal crisis. Yet, the industrial and agrarian disaster of 1959-1961 created substantial disaffection in the P.L.A. and in the militia. Apparently Party leaders did not seriously fear a major revolt, but they were worried. It appears that in the event of a major and protracted economic crisis in the future the Party could not fully depend on its conscript army and mass militia to provide a thoroughly reliable defense of the Party's dictatorship.

The intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute has also weakened the defenses of the Chinese Communist regime. In the past, one of the strongest supports for Peking's security and pretensions to great power status has been the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Any actual or potential enemy has had to consider gravely the possibility that the U.S.S.R. would intervene to support its Chinese ally. Now Peking must have very serious doubts that Moscow would risk thermonuclear war to support Red China, should it become involved in a conflict with a major power.

²² See Statement of Secretary of Defense, p. 10, and "Address by the Hon. Roger Hilsman, Ass't. Sec. of State for Far East," Aug. 20, 1963, Dept. of State Press Release, No. 429, p. 3.

²³ See Powell, *Politico-Military Relationships*, pp. 11-12; *The Military Balance*, p. 10; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 24.



Reprinted from *Geographic Regions of Asia: South and East*
U. S. Department of State, 1964.

DANGER OF EXPANSION

What military threat may Communist China present to the world during the next decade? Both ideological and historical influences tend to make Red China expansionist. Yet, since the Korean War, Peking's foreign policy actions have been more cautious than her propaganda would indicate. Her leaders have not acted irrationally. They have avoided a direct confrontation with the superior military might of the United States. Furthermore, Peking's opportunities for expansion by conventional war are more circumscribed than is generally realized. Roughly one-third of her frontiers face the powerful Soviet Union. The majority of the other states surrounding China are protected against a conventional invasion in force by defense treaties with the United States or the Soviet Union, or they are areas in defense of which the U.S. has demonstrated a willingness to help. It is very doubtful that Peking will launch a massive invasion, if she is confronted by superior forces and the danger of escalation to nuclear war. Furthermore, if Red China succeeds in developing a small atomic capability, it would be irrational for her to utilize it for other than psychological and propaganda purposes. To employ a limited stockpile of such weapons to initiate a nuclear war could well be suicidal.

However, China has *irredenta* areas and historical claims around her frontiers and

Peking may again launch military operations like those against India in 1962. Such campaigns would probably be wars of limited objectives, fought with the expectation that they could be kept limited. Peking might well intervene also, in as camouflaged a manner as possible, to support her allies in North Vietnam and North Korea if they were to be attacked.

WARS OF LIBERATION

Nevertheless, Communist China's actions and statements, as well as the realities of the world situation, indicate that during the next decade most of Peking's challenges to peace will arise from her pledges to promote and support "wars of liberation" and revolutions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Maoist revolutionary doctrine is being actively exported as a model for insurrections in all of the less developed areas. Red China is engaged in and is capable of increasing its revolutionary activities, such as the training of political cadres and guerrilla specialists. She can also supply limited material support to revolutionaries.

Such policies are in accordance with Peking's ideology, they are relatively inexpensive, and are much less dangerous to Peking than becoming overtly involved in war. Conditions in Asia, Africa and Latin America provide opportunities for Communist-led revolts; the postwar insurrections in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya and Vietnam indicate how terribly dangerous and costly such revolts can be.

Ralph L. Powell, formerly a faculty member at Princeton University, was a professor at the National War College from 1954 to 1956 and again between 1958 and 1961. He also served as Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs at Taipei on Taiwan in 1957-1958. Mr. Powell is author of *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955) and *Politico-Military Relationships in Communist China* (Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 1963).

"West European nations have increasingly found that their national interests required postures toward Communist China different from that of the United States," says this observer of the China scene. China is anxious, he continues, since its diplomatic recognition by France, to receive additional recognition as evidence of its "stability and permanence" and indeed would have already done so had it not "driven such a hard bargain with France."

Communist China and Western Europe

By OLIVER M. LEE

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii

NOT SINCE THE BEGINNING of the Korean War in 1950 had any West European government extended diplomatic recognition to Communist China. President Charles de Gaulle of France broke this pattern by extending such recognition on January 27, 1964, after only a minimum of forewarning to his allies. This constituted the latest in a series of French moves running counter to United States policy, such as France's veto of British entry into the European Common Market, her rejection of the proposed multilateral nuclear fleet, and her refusal to sign the partial nuclear test ban treaty.

Four days later de Gaulle dropped another bombshell by calling for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. He proposed this at a time when the United States was becoming increasingly concerned about the growth of Vietcong power in South Vietnam, and was stepping up its efforts to reverse the military tide in that country. De Gaulle's suggestion for neutralization conflicted with this important United States objective, and Washington interpreted it as constituting still another petulant defiance by de Gaulle of United States leadership of the Free World.

And defiance it was. All of these actions were taken, in part, to assert the independence of French foreign policy from that of the

United States; to suggest that France, while not so powerful as the United States, is capable of conducting a more realistic and more mature foreign policy. But de Gaulle, beyond seeking to gain some psychological satisfaction on behalf of himself and his nation, was also pursuing more concrete objectives. These consisted of economic, political, or military benefits for France; they were to enhance France's national interest.

If we think of de Gaulle's actions in these terms, as he certainly does, we shall be able to find some logic in them, and shall be less surprised by his future foreign policy moves, and, indeed, the foreign policy moves of other West European nations. The truth is that national interest is the most powerful organizing principle in the foreign policies of most nations, rather than, say, ideological solidarity across national boundaries. This fact, obscured during the first postwar decade, is only recently becoming increasingly obvious with the widening rifts in the alliances on both sides of the Iron Curtain. But, with regard to policy towards Communist China in particular, the interests of Western Europe gradually began to diverge from those of the United States at the very beginning of the Peking regime.

When the Chinese Communists on October 1, 1949, established the Central People's

Government of the People's Republic of China, the United States gave serious consideration to recognizing this new regime.¹ The Chinese Communists, however, lost no time in raising obstacles against this possibility. On October 24, they summarily arrested Angus Ward, the United States Consul General in Mukden, together with four members of his staff. Secretary of State Dean Acheson termed this a "direct violation of the basic concepts of international relations which have been developed throughout the centuries." On January 14, 1950, Communist China struck another blow. Having warned the United States Consul General in Peking that the consular buildings would be seized, and after United States notice that such an act would cause the United States to close all of its official establishments in China, the Peking authorities sent police to invade the compounds and seize them. Dean Acheson told the Secretary-General of the United Nations that "the United States would certainly not recognize Peking in such circumstances and was opposed to seating the Communist regime in the United Nations."

On the next day, French consular properties in Peking were likewise seized, and a few days later Peking extended diplomatic recognition to the Communist-led insurgents in French Indochina. French Premier George Bidault recalled three months later that "France was ready to recognize the Mao regime, but when Mao and the U.S.S.R. recognized Ho Chi Minh recognition on our part was rendered impossible."²

Other Western nations were not treated by Peking in the same offensive manner, thus making it possible for some of them to react more positively than the United States and France. Thus, Great Britain and Norway

both recognized the Peking regime on January 6, 1950, Denmark did so on January 9, Sweden on January 14. The Netherlands, on March 27, was the last nation prior to the Korean War to grant recognition to Communist China. On the part of Great Britain, the protection of Hong Kong from Communist annexation provided a special incentive for recognition of the new government of mainland China.

POLICY TOWARD U.S.

The Chinese Communists' provocative actions aimed at the United States were part of a policy, persisting down to the present, of creating a maximum amount of tension between the United States and Communist China, to the extent that this is compatible with China's national security. Peking averted the possibility of United States diplomatic recognition, thereby preventing the establishment of more or less normal diplomatic and economic relations and, furthermore, creating conditions which made possible enormous future increases in tension between the two nations.

One condition desired by Communist China was that it not be admitted to the United Nations Security Council, which, between January 10 and 13 of 1950, was debating that very question. It being considered a procedural question at that time, seven votes would have sufficed to expel the Chinese Nationalists and admit the Communist delegation. Five Security Council members had already recognized Peking—Great Britain, Norway, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and India—and could be expected to vote for its admittance. If there still remained a possibility that the United States and France might extend recognition and vote for Peking's admission, this needed to be discouraged.³ Although it is true that the seizing of United States and French consular properties was not done until after the defeat of the Soviet resolution for Peking's admission,⁴ nonetheless the notes warning of such seizure were delivered prior to the Security Council vote.⁵ By this maneuver Peking also ensured against the possibility, for the near future, of

¹ See Quincy Wright, "The Chinese Recognition Problem," *American Journal of International Law*, July, 1955, p. 329.

² Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 266.

³ Cf. G. F. Hudson, "British Relations with China," *Current History*, December, 1957, p. 329.

⁴ See United Nations Security Council, *Official Records*, Fifth Year, 461st meeting, p. 10.

⁵ See U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, vol. 22 (1950), p. 119.

any subsequent Security Council vote in favor of her admission.

Upon the outbreak of the Korean War, the West European members of the Security Council voted for both of the resolutions which led to United Nations intervention in Korea, and during the next several months a number of West European nations sent some naval and ground units to participate in the fighting.

When, in October of 1950, the United Nations forces were pushing towards the Manchurian border, some of these nations became more concerned than the United States that the Chinese Communists might become alarmed over their national security and react violently. The British chiefs-of-staff, for example, advised that the United Nations troops halt their offensive at the narrow waist of the peninsula, leaving a buffer zone between them and China. However, they were not heeded.

After the Chinese "volunteer" troops did smash into the United Nations forces, President Harry S. Truman stated at a press conference that it might be necessary for General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the United Nations forces, to extend the Korean War into Manchuria and perhaps even to use the atomic bomb. This so alarmed France and Britain that their prime ministers conferred immediately, and the then British Prime Minister Clement Attlee flew to Washington to convey this alarm directly to the President.⁶ It was, of course, over these very questions of extending the Korean War that President Truman was later to relieve from command General MacArthur, who favored extension.

For seven weeks the United Nations forces were in retreat, but finally, by mid-January, 1951, they were able to stand firm and gradually push northward again. During those

seven weeks Peking had thrown cold water on any and all efforts by United Nations members to bring about a cease-fire, which induced most of them, on February 1, to vote for a United States draft resolution condemning Communist China as an aggressor.⁷ Of the West European nations, Sweden abstained from voting, but Britain, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway voted for condemnation. These six nations repeated the same voting pattern three months later on a United States draft resolution recommending that every United Nations member apply an embargo on the shipment to Communist China and North Korea of "arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war."⁸

FRENCH INDOCHINA

In the final stages of the war in Indochina, a decade ago, the principal West European actors were France and Great Britain. Whereas there had been considerable harmony among France, Britain, and the United States in the Korean War, the situation in Indochina contained several new elements making for disharmony. Not the least of these was that the United States had suffered some 130,000 casualties in Korea and had become deeply hostile toward the Chinese Communists.

In the autumn of 1953, the seven-year war between the French and the Communist-led Vietminh was taking an ominous turn. The Korean War by then having been brought to an armistice, Peking was able to divert large-scale material aid to the Vietminh. On September 14, 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated "there is the risk that, as in Korea, Red China might send its own army into Indochina," and warned that such an act would have "grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina."⁹ Four months later he hinted at the use of nuclear weapons by referring to America's "massive retaliatory power."¹⁰ Unfortunately these threats, by clearly defining the conditions

⁶ See Evan Luard, *Britain and China* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1962), p. 94.

⁷ See United Nations General Assembly, *Official Records: Resolutions*, Fifth Session, Resolution (498(V)).

⁸ *Ibid.*, Resolution (500(V)).

⁹ U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, vol. 29 (1953), p. 342.

¹⁰ Council on Foreign Relations, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, (New York: Harper, 1954), pp. 9-10.

under which massive retaliation would be seriously considered, implicitly also defined the extent to which Peking *could* aid the Vietminh without running the risk of such retaliation.

Consequently the Chinese continued to pour in large quantities of supplies and equipment to aid the Vietminh, without sending troops in, and the Vietminh continued to gain ground. Without direct participation by Chinese troops, the United States not only found massive nuclear retaliation untenable, but could not even bring itself to intervene with conventional forces. President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed this reluctance by saying that "no one could be more bitterly opposed to ever getting the United States involved in a hot war in that region than I am."¹¹

SEIGE OF DIEN BIEN PHU

But the French military position was continually getting worse. When the siege of Dien Bien Phu began in mid-March of 1954, France desperately requested 1,000 B-24 bombers and two or three paratroop divisions from the United States.¹² On April 3, Secretary Dulles and Admiral Arthur W. Radford tried to persuade congressional leaders to secure a joint resolution by Congress authorizing the President to use air and naval power in Indochina. This was refused on several grounds, one of which was that Dulles had not consulted America's allies.¹³

President Eisenhower thereupon decided not only to consult the British, but to make American military intervention in Indochina conditional upon British participation. On April 10, Dulles flew to London to try to persuade the British of the necessity of joint action, and thence to Paris. The communiqués

issued after the meetings in both capitals promised vaguely that the conferring governments, together with other interested nations, were ready to take part "in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense" in Southeast Asia.¹⁴

Dulles, hoping to implement this vague agreement quickly, on April 20 called a meeting of ambassadors in Washington for the purpose of forming a Southeast Asia treaty organization. The British, however, were anxious not only to avoid intervention in Indochina prior to the Geneva conference scheduled to open on April 26, but also to avoid giving the impression of planning such intervention. Accordingly, they instructed their ambassador in Washington not to participate in the meeting convoked by Dulles. No Allied intervention took place.

Dien Bien Phu was captured by the Vietminh on May 7. The next day the Geneva conference, including Communist China as a participant, turned from the Korean problem to the Indochinese problem. In France, the conservative cabinet of Josef Laniel was replaced by that of Pierre Mendes-France, who set himself a 30-day deadline for achieving an armistice on "honorable" terms. With the Communist powers exhibiting considerable moderation,¹⁵ an armistice agreement was signed on July 21 which both France and Britain found satisfactory under the circumstances, and which the United States, while refusing to sign, promised not to obstruct.

FOREIGN TRADE

Following the United Nations resolution on the trade embargo against China, fifteen nations, mostly members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization plus Japan, agreed on a list of over 400 items of military significance which they would henceforth refuse to sell to Communist China. This list was more than twice as long as that applied against the Soviet Union and the East European satellites, the difference being termed the "China differential." The differential included trucks, locomotives, machine tools, internal combustion engines, scientific instruments, generators, tires, tractors, and many other

¹¹ *The New York Times*, February 11, 1954.

¹² See Marquis Childs, *The Ragged Edge: The Diary of a Crisis* (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 95.

¹³ See Chalmers Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go to War," *The Reporter*, September 15, 1954, p. 33.

¹⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-259.

¹⁵ See William H. Stoneman, "Why Red China Acted So Tame at Geneva," *Chicago Daily News*, July 22, 1954.

items.¹⁶ This naturally brought about a drop in West European exports to Communist China, and a corresponding increase in Chinese imports of these items from the Soviet bloc.

By 1957, there were considerable pressures within the West European countries for abandoning the "China differential" which in practice did not seem to deprive China of the goods in question. Great Britain, partly out of anger at the way the United States had treated her during the Suez crisis a year earlier, on May 30 unilaterally scrapped the "China differential," much to the disappointment of the United States government.

Half a dozen European nations followed Britain's example, and the annual trade between these nations and Communist China approximately doubled in 1958, maintaining that higher level for two years thereafter. One fortuitous factor behind this increase was the rupture of Sino-Japanese trade relations in May, 1958, because of a flag incident, causing Peking to turn to Western Europe for certain goods it had imported from Japan.

West European trade with China declined during 1961 and 1962, because China's agricultural failures had induced her to buy several million tons of grain from Canada and Australia, which meant that less foreign exchange was available for importing industrial products from Europe. Although the worst of the agricultural crisis has passed, the Peking government has continued to import such grain in order to replenish her exhausted reserves. But, in spite of continued grain imports, Peking in 1963 and 1964 has been able to increase its foreign exchange earnings sufficiently, as well as to arrange for medium-term credit, so as to increase trade with Western Europe once again.¹⁷

We have seen that the West European nations have increasingly found that their na-

tional interests required postures toward Communist China different from that of the United States. Since General de Gaulle has been the most articulate in charting an independent China policy, it may be instructive to examine his reasoning.

DE GAULLE'S DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

De Gaulle's China policy is based on a realistic grasp of the fact that the ideological commitment of the Chinese Communist leaders is centered on China rather than the Soviet Union or the international proletariat. This is part of his larger understanding that in a world of sovereign nations, it is the national interest that shapes the foreign policies of governments, rather than any transnational interests. On the basis of this insight, de Gaulle was able, as early as 1959, to foresee something of the deep split that exists in Sino-Soviet relations today. The earlier close cooperation between China and the Soviet Union was due, de Gaulle believes, to a short-run coincidence of national interests rather than to any suppression of China's interests by her own rulers. Recently, says de Gaulle,

The inevitable difference of national policies appears every day through an increasingly ragged cloak. . . . It follows that the attitude and the action of a people numbering 700 million are effectively controlled only by its own government.¹⁸

Mikhail A. Suslov, Soviet theoretician, complained recently that Peking's propaganda "reduces the entire struggle against imperialism solely to a struggle with the United States—bypassing its allies—the Japanese, West German and French imperialists," and that "the Chinese theory of an intermediate zone . . . objectively whitewashes the imperialists of Britain, France, West Germany and Japan, for whom this is advantageous."¹⁹ While de Gaulle would not use the same vocabulary, he had himself perceived the basic reality contained in Suslov's statement, and made use of the advantageous situation referred to by extending recognition to Peking.

In practical terms, it is China's possession of independent interests, increasingly divergent from those of the Soviets, that has

¹⁶ See *The New York Times*, May 31, 1957, p. 2.

¹⁷ See article on foreign trade in this issue of *Current History*, pp. 000.

¹⁸ Louis J. Halle, "He May Be Right about China But Wrong about Europe," *The New Republic*, February 22, 1964, p. 17.

¹⁹ "Summary of Suslov's Attack on the 'Dangerous Actions' of Peking's Leadership," *The New York Times*, April 4, 1964, p. 10.

brought about the fact that in Indochina in 1954 and in Laos in 1962 "it was a sheer waste of time to negotiate with the Soviet Union and that, contrariwise, negotiations moved rapidly toward an effective conclusion as soon as Mao Tse-tung's representatives were present."²⁰ That same independence, also, is what has caused Peking to look to Western Europe for industrial goods, in accordance with her own needs, to supplement her imports from the Soviet bloc.

To facilitate dealings on both the diplomatic and economic front, de Gaulle deems that extending diplomatic recognition to Peking was a rational move. Viewing this to be in France's national interest, de Gaulle felt he had to extend recognition regardless of whether the United States liked it or not. He has put this pragmatic step in a dazzling light by stating:

Above all, it may be that in the immense evolution of the world, by multiplying the relations between peoples one serves the cause of mankind—that is to say, the cause of wisdom, of progress, and of peace. It may be that such contacts contribute to the attenuation, now begun, of the dramatic contrasts and oppositions between the different camps that divide the world. It may be that thus the souls of men, wherever they may be in the earth, will meet somewhat earlier at the rendezvous to which France summoned the world, 175 years ago now—that of liberty, of equality, and of fraternity.²¹

MAO'S DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY

As Communist China has conducted considerable trade with nations not recognizing the Peking régime, such as Australia, Canada, West Germany, Italy, Argentina, Japan, and others, the value to Peking of French recognition is not likely to lie in prospects of increased trade. If trade between China and France increases, it will be because Peking makes larger purchases from France in order to show others what they are missing by not also extending recognition.

Peking values France's diplomatic recognition, and would like to receive recognition from others, not for economic but for po-

litical reasons. There are the conventional practical benefits of establishing diplomatic relations, such as the day-to-day contact with official and unofficial elites in the foreign country and the resulting opportunities of acquiring information and exerting influence.

More important to Peking, however, is the sheer psychological impact, internationally and at home, of receiving diplomatic recognition from a nation which had refused to do so for a decade and a half. Several such recognitions per year would suffice to create the impression of an inexorable process which is founded on the unshakeable reality of Communist China's stability and permanence.

Any quicker rush of recognitions is not needed by Communist China, and is not sought. In 1964 alone, Peking undoubtedly could have received many more recognitions if she had not driven such a hard bargain with France. De Gaulle at first assumed, as most others did, that Peking would not insist on France severing relations with Nationalist China. But he was mistaken, for Peking insisted on being treated as the "sole legal government" of China, whereupon the French government pressured Nationalist China into breaking off relations with France.

Peking thus forced France, and is forcing others, to choose between Communist and Nationalist China. Peking is not permitting those who are contemplating recognition, such as Belgium, Portugal, Canada, Italy, Japan, and Mexico, to have diplomatic relations with "two Chinas." The United

(Continued on page 179)

Oliver M. Lee, prior to undertaking his assignment at the University of Hawaii, was Analyst in Far Eastern Affairs at the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress in 1962-1963. This followed four years of teaching political science at the University of Maryland. Earlier, in 1956, he was Research Assistant at the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the University of Chicago, after which he served as Strategic Intelligence Analyst in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1957-1958.

²⁰ Jean Daniel, "De Gaulle and Red China," *The New Republic*, February 1, 1964, p. 9.

²¹ Halle, *loc cit.*

"There are a number of reasons for suspecting that the Chinese Communists are finding it increasingly desirable to be represented at the United Nations, and hence may be willing to make some concessions," notes this specialist, who points out that all nations use the United Nations "as an instrument in pursuit of their national interests."

China and the United Nations

By WERNER LEVI

Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii

THE CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION the two Chinas have attracted in the League of Nations and in the United Nations has not been in proportion to the benefit they obtained or the contribution they made. Nevertheless, the Nationalist and the Communist governments have used the organizations in their foreign policies and have tried to extract every possible advantage from membership. At times, substantial aid was thus obtained from the economic and social agencies. In the political realm, the rewards were mostly in the field of propaganda. The weakness of the Nationalist government and the absence of the Communist government prevented China from playing the role of a great power so generously assigned to her at the Cairo Conference of 1943. At no time were the high hopes fulfilled that the organizations might help solve China's many international problems.

The disappointments began when, contrary to Woodrow Wilson's expectations, the League failed to provide the relief for China's grievances denied at the Versailles Conference. China's international position improved throughout the 1920's, but improvement was entirely due to her diplomatic efforts outside the League. Even so, the Nationalist government did not lose faith in the League. When Japan's war against China began with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, China deliberately refrained from seri-

ous military counteraction to make it easy for the League to determine the aggressor and what was to be done against him. But the League failed to act. Its political impotence was subsequently confirmed when it remained inactive in response to China's calls for help in 1937 and 1938 against renewed Japanese aggression. A declaration that Japan was an aggressor would have stopped the flow of strategic materials to Japan. But even that satisfaction was not given. It is not surprising therefore that in the Communist view, then and now, the League was simply one more instrument of the "imperialistic conspiracy" to divide and destroy China. The Communist government's lack of eagerness for representation at the United Nations may be due as much to China's disheartening experience with international organizations as to "sour grapes."

Notwithstanding China's disappointments, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek called for a strong world organization backed by international force as one of the aims of World War II. China's participation in the shaping of the United Nations at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences was based on the hope that her unfortunate experience might be the guide to the construction of a more effective organization. As a Chinese editorial put it at that time: "The failure of the League, instead of being a source of disillusionment, should afford a valuable lesson

to makers of future history." In this spirit, and against the background of China's past victimization by Western imperialism and Japanese militarism, the Chinese delegation emphasized guarantees for the territorial integrity of states and machinery for the maintenance of peace.

But as it turned out, these safeguards did not save China from the ravages of violence; and China's active participation in the making of the Charter assured no great improvement in her experiences with the organization. Neither government fared well in the United Nations. China's elevation to great power status and the gift of veto power were more than balanced by the unfavorable results first of the Nationalist government's collapse and then by the Communist government's aggressive behavior. All too often, China's potential influence was nullified because, for her, the United Nations served mainly as the theater in which the drama of her internal conflicts and their international consequences could be played. These conflicts had global significance, but they were embarrassing to many member nations, and fighting them out on the world scene made China unpopular.

POLITICAL ISSUES

On political questions touching China's important interests, she was usually outvoted or overruled. On August 24, 1950, for instance, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean war and the "neutralization" of Formosa, the Communist government sent a telegram to the United Nations accusing the United States of "invading" Taiwan and asking for a withdrawal of American troops. The Nationalist government vetoed any move to consider this "protest" but was overruled, and the Communist complaint appeared as an item on the agenda. Again, on November 8 of that year, China (and Cuba) vetoed an invitation to the Communist government to be represented before the United Nations during a discussion of aggression in Korea. Once more she was overruled—a ruling she considered incorrect and invalid.

China was equally unsuccessful, in the long

run, in preventing Outer Mongolia's membership in the United Nations, although in this case her veto in 1955 was acknowledged. But when the question came up again in October, 1961, Mongolia's membership was suggested in a "package deal" including Mauritania. China then did not participate in the voting, fearing that keeping Mauritania out of the organization through a veto on Mongolia might antagonize too many African nations and threaten the insecure position of the Nationalist representatives in the United Nations.

Even more unsatisfactory was China's experience with the handling of her complaint that the Soviet Union had violated both the charter and her Friendship Treaty with China by supporting the Communists in their war with the Nationalists. The incident demonstrated, however, how little sympathy there was for the Nationalist cause. China's complaint was answered by a vague resolution of the General Assembly in the early fall of 1949, appealing to the nations to respect China's political independence and territorial integrity. The resolution was highly reminiscent of the Nine-Power Treaty concluded at Washington in 1922 and not very encouraging to China's self-respect as a "great power." By the time the General Assembly passed another resolution, on December 8, 1949, the Communists had come to power on the mainland, and the complaint was pigeon-holed in the Interim Committee with the charge that it be continuously "examined." The Committee decided to do no such thing and the Nationalist government pushed the issue further. In the fall of 1950, and again the next year, it stubbornly pursued the accusation against the Soviet Union, clearly without any hope of practical results. Moral victory finally came, though at the cost of popularity, in the form of a General Assembly resolution (25 votes in favor, 9 opposed, with 24 abstentions) affirming that the Soviet Union had "failed to carry out" her treaty with China.

On the Korean question, the Nationalist government, lacking choice and in an unhappy mood, followed United Nations policy.

It was greatly worried over the reluctance of some United Nations members to take a strong stand. It severely criticized some Western nations for adopting a "Europe first" attitude. Peace was indivisible, admonished Chiang; the Western democracies "must abandon their past policy of concentrating all their attention on Europe to the neglect of Asia. Equal attention must be paid to the freedom or enslavement of the Asiatic peoples as it has been paid to the peoples of Europe. Equal support must be given to the Asiatic peoples in their anti-Communist efforts as it has been given to the Europeans."

This was the theme at which officials and newspapers hammered away throughout the war. The same worry prevailed with regard to neutralism. The idea of neutralism, said the foreign minister, G. K. C. Yeh, was "sheer fallacy." Had the many nations in the League been less neutral and more willing to apply sanctions, he argued, World War II might have been prevented; equally effective sanctions in Korea might prevent later catastrophes. Many Chinese were annoyed by the reluctance of member nations to differentiate between right and wrong, and they criticized United Nations action as weak and disgraceful.

PRESERVATION OF PEACE

When China's interests were less directly affected by issues, the Nationalist government showed less sympathy for condemnatory proceedings and occasionally opposed them on the grounds that nothing was gained by distributing praise and blame or establishing right and wrong. The important thing was to preserve or restore peace; China therefore expressed preference for the pacific settlement of disputes and conflicts. In essence, this was the policy Nationalist China advocated in the Indonesian, Palestinian, Kashmirian and similar cases. It was not always appreciated by the parties involved and brought praise or condemnation from one or the other side, and at times rightly so, because what was represented as a position of high principle was in effect taking sides.

On many occasions, however, the National-

ist government wished to take a genuinely ambivalent position, attempting to antagonize neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, to find a *modus vivendi* with both. This became evident during the negotiations for the Charter, and remained true until the break with Moscow was final. Only then did China side unequivocally with the United States. The present attempt of the Nationalist leaders to keep the United States fully committed to their policy (and their bitter, even insulting reaction to former Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman's hint at possible future negotiations with the Communists should they change their policies) is not based on brotherly feelings but on the proper pursuit of their national interests.

The Nationalist government has at all times, like all other governments, served China's interests as it saw them. This is an unsentimental practice, legitimate according to the rules of diplomacy. The argument that the United States has a moral obligation to the Nationalist government because the Nationalists "stuck by" the United States is based on a misreading of the facts of Nationalist policy and of its motivations. The same freedom which allows the Nationalists to follow their interests must be accorded to the United States. Each is entitled to flexibility in shaping its policies to the dictates of national interests which may or may not coincide, and which may or may not allow for sentiment.

The changing fortunes of the Chinese representation question in the United Nations and the ever-moving conditions of world affairs responsible for them are a good measure of the need for adjustment in United States as well as Nationalist policies. On this much debated question, there have been two fronts: the United States and the Communist, with numerous non-Communist nations in the no-man's land between. The split between the Soviet Union and Communist China has added a new dimension to the debate. A growing blur is faintly noticeable in the front lines, and the no-man's land may be expanding. There are some hints, trial balloons perhaps, that the American position may lose

some rigidity. At the same time, the Soviet position has moved slightly in the opposite direction. The Soviet Union still favors Peking's presence in the organization, but without the ardor of previous years. A similar shift is noticeable among the many nations which have hitherto been influenced in their voting by the stand of the Big Two. So far, Peking has not benefitted from this motion; on the contrary. But this is due mostly to the bellicose policies of the Communists which make it difficult to vote in favor of Peking even for those who, in principle, wish to do so. In fact, this situation has prevailed ever since the Communists seized power.

AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR

When early in January, 1950, the Security Council seemed ready to seat the Communists, Peking recognized the Vietminh regime and France was instrumental in keeping Peking out of the Council. By the time the General Assembly met that fall, aggression had begun in Korea. In the middle 1950's, after the Geneva and Bandung conferences, Peking lost much of its newly acquired sympathy through its activities in the Himalayas. India subsequently found it difficult to champion the Communist cause.

Nevertheless, between 1950 and 1960 the margin between the majority vote opposing Peking's representation and the minority favoring it constantly diminished. Since 1960 this margin has again increased—somewhat paradoxically, because public opinion and private business interests in many countries have tended to favor Communist representation. However, it seems that Communist China's increasingly aggressive behavior toward the end of the decade, culminating in the invasion of India, overshadows these business interests and explains the reversal in the trend of votes on Communist China's United Nations representation.

What motivates the Chinese Communists is difficult to guess. They never seemed overly eager to join the United Nations. They express great confidence in eventual victory and apparently do not consider a seat in the organization worth the price of "good behavior."

In October, 1963, Foreign Minister Chen Yi announced that China had no intention of acquiring a seat in the United Nations because "under present circumstances" she had "no role to play in the U.N."; he probably meant what he said.

It does not follow, however, that Communist China is not interested in the United Nations. On the contrary, Peking has always paid close attention to its proceedings. It regularly comments amply on the issues and uses United Nations votes wherever possible in its propaganda campaigns. This has been especially true of such issues as colonialism or racism, which could serve to mount an attack on the United States. The denial of Communist representation has been cited cleverly and effectively as "proof" of continuing Western imperialism, anti-Asianism, and racial discrimination, all under United States leadership. Possibly, Peking attracts as much attention to herself outside the United Nations by using the organization, as she would were she present. This she can do without the burden of responsible participation, and without expense.

The official position of the Chinese Communists is that Peking will not make any concession for the sake of representing China in the United Nations and that the Communist Chinese will take their seat on their own conditions. Their initial willingness to deal with United Nations organs (during the Korean War and its aftermath) ended in 1955 with the declaration that a representative would deal with the organization only if he could speak "in the name of China." Their rejection of a "Two China" situation is also unequivocal: "China will not participate in any international conference, organization or undertaking in which representatives of the Taiwan local authorities are participating, no matter by what name they call themselves." The prerequisite for Communist representation would be the elimination of all "elements of the Chiang Kai-shek clique" from all organs of the United Nations.

Suggestions for a compromise are resolutely rejected. When a *New York Times* editorial in October, 1963, suggested simultaneous

representation of Formosa and the mainland, the idea was ridiculed. While China was glad that American eyes were now sufficiently open to see that there was a China and a Peking, said the Communist radio, the plan was totally unacceptable. Hilsman's "open door" speech—so severely criticized by the Nationalists as appeasement—was condemned in Peking as an outline for further American aggression.

A CHANGING ATTITUDE

Yet this proud and almost defiant official intransigence did not appear to reflect the true attitude of the Peking regime. As the split with Moscow grew deeper, some qualifications made their cautious appearance. The occasion was the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1963–1964, during which the Sino-Soviet controversy entered the organization for the first time with full force and began to rival, if not overshadow, the more traditional Soviet-American conflict. The new development began with the customary resolution regarding the representation of China. The United States announced once again that she would not oppose debate and the Steering Committee put the item on the agenda.

Previous to the sixteenth session (1961) India had sponsored the traditional resolution of seating the Communists. During the sixteenth and seventeenth session, the Soviet Union had sponsored it. In 1963, Albania sponsored it, with Cambodia as the co-sponsor. Through much of the session, Albania was the spokesman, though by no means the satellite, of Communist China. It was her expression of gratitude for China's support of her independence from the Soviet Union. Cambodia's co-sponsorship was, as editorials in the government-approved *Dépêche de Cambodge* pointed out, an act of friendship and realism as well as a contribution to peace. To keep 700 million Chinese from being represented was described as unjust as well as unjustifiable. Those who opposed the seating of Communist China were accused, illogically, of racism. India favored seating it in the hope that "within the discipline of this

august body . . . it can no longer persist in the ways of an outlaw." The Soviet Union based her affirmative vote on realism. In contrast to previous years, she neither praised the peaceful qualities of Communist China nor attacked the imperialism of the United States, and her press reported the facts without comments.

Peking reacted to the unfavorable vote with her usual vitriolic attack against the United States, which was accused of manipulating the United Nations in order to deprive China of her "legitimate rights" in the organization; of behaving illegally and in a warlike fashion; of engaging in "smear-acts"; of using the stock phrases of the past decade and copying charges "from the book of slander against China that is being compiled by certain people" (in Chinese parlance of 1963, the Russians). The foreign minister stated that his government had no intention of gaining a seat "at present" and that, "insofar" as the United Nations was manipulated by the United States, the organization had been a "monkey show" for many years and the Communists despised it.

U.N. CHARTER REVISION

Chinese Communist policy toward the United Nations was revealed more clearly when the General Assembly grappled with the issue of organizational changes. On September 16, 1963, 58 Asian and African delegations wrote two letters, requesting three changes in the organization of the United Nations. All aimed at more effective realization of the principle of equitable geographic distribution of seats and offices in United Nations organs by increasing the number of Asian and African representatives. The first proposed change referred to an enlargement of the General Committee of the General Assembly. It was accepted unanimously. The remaining two changes were more controversial. Thirty-seven Asian and African nations introduced two resolutions, both involving amendments of the Charter under Article 108. The first suggested an increase in the membership of the Security Council by the addition of four non-permanent mem-

bers. The second suggested an increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven.

In the past, the position of the Soviet Union had been that in the absence of the Communist Chinese representatives, she would veto any attempt to amend the Charter. Peking's traditional stand had been that China would not be committed to any action of the United Nations so long as the Communists would not represent her. If both maintained this position, the desire of the African and Asian nations for more equitable representation in the seats and offices of United Nations organs would be frustrated and could lead to a loss of that sympathy for which both Communist nations were engaged in the most intense rivalry.

If they did not maintain their position, complications in other directions would arise; in particular, Soviet agreement to any Charter amendment could imply approval of Nationalist representation and even, as Peking and the Soviet delegate pointed out, establish the "Two China" situation *de facto*. The unfavorable possibilities for the Soviet Union were more numerous than for the Chinese Communists. It was clear immediately that the two resolutions would become enmeshed in the Sino-Soviet conflict, especially as it related to the African nations.

Maneuvering on the issue began as soon as the letters asking for the changes were written. Peking sent a communication to Moscow and several Asian and African capitals to clarify its stand on the United Nations in general and the organizational changes in particular. Peking pointed out that "eviction of the elements of the Chiang Kai-shek clique is the prerequisite to the restoration of China's legitimate rights." Until that moment, all activities by the Nationalist representatives would be considered illegal and "China cannot be held responsible for any activities of the United Nations." But, the communication continued, "Under the circumstances, each action of the United Nations

will be judged by China on its intrinsic merits. China will resolutely oppose all evil doings of the United Nations, but will have no objection to the good things, if any, done by the United Nations."

A "PECULIAR" POSITION

After the statement of these principles, China assured the Asian and African nations of her "active support" in their efforts to increase their representation in the principal United Nations organs and suggested two ways in which this might be achieved. One would be to revise the Charter, a "very complicated" method. The other would be to leave the Charter alone "for the time being" and choose the method, "simpler and easier to carry out," of readjusting the distribution of seats. The communication then emphasized that the question of revising the Charter and the question of restoring China's "legitimate rights" were unrelated and should not be "bundled together." Then, Peking asserted ambivalently—having just suggested Charter revision as a possibility—"while it continues to be excluded from the United Nations, China will undertake no commitment on the question of revision of these articles by the United Nations."¹ This communication was followed, on October 2, by the Chinese foreign minister's public reiteration of support for the Asian-African request. Two days later, Moscow asked for clarifications of the communication and received it. And early in December another exchange of notes, in the same vein, took place.

The climax came in the middle of December when the resolutions were debated in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly and in the Assembly itself. The Soviet delegate spoke on several occasions against the two resolutions, arguing that "at the present time" "objective conditions" for solving the question of amendments to the Charter were lacking. His government was much in favor of the spirit of the resolutions, but unfortunately the policy of the Western powers made any changes impossible. No infringement of the rights of Communist China could be tolerated. The Soviet Union

¹ The Soviet delegate to the United Nations referred to this as the "peculiar way" in which the Chinese phrased their position.

"takes an understanding attitude to the stand of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic" which was, as the Soviet delegate described it, that the method of securing the African and Asian countries a fairer representation proposed in the resolutions could not be approved.

The Albanian delegate insisted that the Soviet Union distorted Peking's position which was, he said, favorable to both resolutions. But the Soviet delegate arose once more to buttress his interpretation of Communist China's position. He quoted an editorial from the *People's Daily* of December 21, 1961, to the effect that any Charter amendment without Peking's approval would be unlawful. He quoted a Chinese deputy foreign minister who had told the Soviet ambassador in Peking on December 5, 1963, that "we do not approve solving this question by broadening the composition of the U.N. bodies; we stand for solving it by just distribution of the present seats in these bodies." He quoted a Peking statement of December 12 in which clear preference for this "easier" method was expressed. And, finally, he quoted a Chinese note to Moscow in which it was pointed out that any assent to an amendment could lead to the creation of a "Two China" situation. Therefore, to safeguard Chinese interests, the Soviet Union would vote against the resolutions. She did, and so did all the Soviet satellites and France. The United States and three other nations abstained. Thus, although the resolutions were passed by large majorities in the General Assembly, ratification seemed impossible.

The Chinese used their vast propaganda machine to counteract this Soviet maneuver of making the Chinese Communists appear responsible for the failure of the African-Asian enterprise. Moscow was accused of falsifying the Chinese position for her own ulterior purposes: it was really the Soviet Union which was unfavorable to the resolutions, but she misrepresented China's stand to cover up her own opposition to the legitimate demands of the Africans and Asians and at the same time to sow discord between them and China.

China's attack on the Soviet Union and the exploitation of Moscow's negative vote came at an opportune moment. Chou En-lai was traveling with ambitious political aims in Africa. Suspicion was growing among African and some Asian delegations to the United Nations that friendlier relations between the American, British and Soviet delegations were in part caused by their wish to prevent the numerous new nations from overrunning the organization. The African nations are growing in importance; their votes count by the mere fact of their large number alone, and they are also beginning to weigh more heavily than the Asians because they speak with a more united voice. China's propaganda fell on fertile ground, and there is some evidence that her stress on Soviet opposition to the two resolutions was effective.

The episode was revealing for the role the United Nations plays in the policies of the Communist nations. Far from wanting to ruin the organization, as has so often been maintained, they consider it important and useful in their international relations. Like all nations, they are using the United Nations as an instrument in pursuit of their national interests. It was, indeed, the assumption of the makers of the Charter that the United Nations would be a better instrument of foreign policy than guns.

There are a number of reasons for suspecting that the Chinese Communists are finding it increasingly desirable to be represented at the United Nations, and hence may be will-

(Continued on page 180)

Werner Levi, formerly professor of political science at the University of Minnesota, is well-known to readers of *Current History*. Since World War II he has traveled and lectured in India, Thailand, Malaysia and Australia. Among his books are: *Free India in Asia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1952); *Modern China's Foreign Policy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1953) and *Australia's Outlook on Asia* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958).

Peking's relations with her Asian neighbors, says this writer, are dictated by China's "overriding aim of again establishing the supremacy of the Chinese state." In accordance with this, "Peking has either actively supported, or maintained studied indifference to, the fate of other Communist parties. . . . One looks in vain for evidence of the strident Chinese call for 'revolution' in reference to any country that has already made its accommodation to China's immediate national interests."

China's Relations with Her Asian Neighbors

By DAVID P. MOZINGO

Staff member, The Rand Corporation

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST regime stands in direct succession to an imperial tradition which consistently held that China, by virtue of its superior civilization, was entitled to take the pre-eminent position among her neighbors. Before the Western powers came to dominate the Far East in the nineteenth century, China's nominal empire extended to such areas as Korea, Mongolia, the Siberian maritime provinces, Tibet and Annam. Between 1840 and 1919 China was forced to accept the dismemberment of these territories from the empire. Mao Tse-tung echoed the traditional Chinese view when, in 1937, he expressed to Edgar Snow his belief that China's historical relationship to these territories would be restored.¹

Having rejected Confucianism, it is nevertheless characteristic that the Chinese Communists, as Chinese, should regard their adopted Communist system as the new Chinese civilizing order which by tradition they must carry forward, eventually, beyond

China's frontiers. Thus, as a Communist, Mao in 1936, could also speak of his broader vision "to lead the Chinese revolution to its completion and also exert a far-reaching influence on the revolution in the East as well as in the whole world."²

Since 1949, Communist China has determinedly pursued policies in relations with her Asian neighbors which plainly seek to restore China's preeminence in the Far East, as well as other powers' acceptance of this situation. This all Chinese would be inclined to regard as the natural and just order of things. For China's rightful position to be recognized, her leaders believe that all Western powers, particularly the United States, must leave the Far East.

These Chinese Communist aspirations have been consistently opposed by American power since 1950 when the Korean War broke out, and since 1956 there have been increasing signs that the Soviet Union is also opposed to the Far Eastern preeminence of the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist party. The power and influence exerted by the two powers on China's Asian neighbors frustrate Peking efforts to restore their acceptance of a China-centered political order.

¹ See Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 96.

² Mao Tse-tung, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," December, 1936. Reprinted in *Selected Works*, Vol. I. (New York: International Publishers, 1954).

In regard to the Asian Communist movement beyond her own frontiers; since approximately 1953 Peking has either actively supported, or maintained studied indifference to, the fate of other Communist parties, depending on which course of action happened to advance the overriding aim of again establishing the supremacy of the Chinese state. The present writer can think of no instance where China's leaders have placed their mission to advance communism outside China above their more immediate, national interests. Where Communist China has favorable *state* relations with countries like Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, Indonesia, and more recently Pakistan, the local parties have been left to cope with their own national and historical circumstances.

Being both Chinese and Marxist, the Chinese Communist party has a sense of history. Time, it believes, will bring Communist parties to power in all Asian countries. The Chinese call for "revolution" in Asia should not be misunderstood or misinterpreted. That call is made with respect to particular countries and conditions: where "the imperialists" are present (i.e., Taiwan, Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Laos) and where native governments, as in the case of India, have adopted "anti-China" policies. One looks in vain for evidence of the strident Chinese call for "revolution" in reference to any country that has already made its accommodation to China's national interests.

When the Chinese People's Republic was established on October 1, 1949, the prospects for restoring China's preeminence were more favorable than at any time since the humiliating century of Western domination in Asia began in 1839. The Japanese empire had been destroyed. On February 14, 1950, a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was concluded which for the first time secured China's northern frontiers against the threat of invasion and

defended China from her main enemy, the United States—the sea power dominating the Pacific.

With the Soviet alliance, moreover, China gained, also for the first time, the backing of a major Western power able (and then evidently willing) to promote the industrial development of China on which all the new regime's aspirations ultimately depended. In South and Southeast Asia the withdrawal of Western power in the wake of granting independence to India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia exposed a broad belt of new, weak states along China's frontiers, who being largely deprived of their former Western military shield, could be expected in a short time to take their subordinate position in the Chinese scheme of things.

THE FIRST WATERSHED

The Korean War marked the first watershed in Communist China's policies toward her neighbors. Until early in 1952, China's leaders had unswervingly adopted Moscow's thesis that the entire world was divided into two opposing camps: those supporting the Soviet bloc and those supporting the "imperialists."³ During this period China's leaders neither wanted nor enjoyed friendly relations with non-Communist Asian states who were all regarded as supporting or ruled by "Western imperialists." Peking made little effort to conceal her opposition to them on ideological as well as political grounds and actively encouraged Asian Communist parties to follow "the path of the Chinese people" in seizing power.⁴

However, the "Two Camp" thesis became outmoded as a policy guide after China entered the Korean War and her objective interests were then best served by normalizing relations with non-Communist states. By intervening in Korea, Peking succeeded in driving the United States back from China's frontier and preserved the North Korean regime. It was, however, beyond China's strength completely to dislodge the United States forces from South Korea, and, by 1952, China's expenditures to maintain the military stalemate heavily burdened her

³ Liu Shao-chi, *Nationalism and Internationalism*, November 1, 1948; reprinted in translation by Foreign Language Press, in Peking, in 1951.

⁴ See Liu Shao-chi, *Inaugural Address to the Asian-Australian Trade Union Conference*, November 23, 1949.

economy on the eve of the First Five Year Plan, begun late that year.

When their industrial development program was launched, the Chinese leaders began to adopt a more conciliatory political stance towards possibly useful trading partners in Europe and Asia, some of whom had begun to express differences with the United States' Far Eastern policy.

THE NEW LINE

The new line normalizing relations with Asian states took more definite political shape when, in April, 1954, China and India, Asia's two largest countries, signed an agreement on the status of Tibet. This treaty, which recognized Tibet as an integral part of China, formally declared the joint Chinese and Indian advocacy of "the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" as the proper basis for relations between Asian states.⁵ Co-sponsorship of the Five Principles and her simultaneous efforts to improve relations with Japan, Indonesia, and Burma gained for Peking widespread Asian acceptance of the view that Communist China wanted to improve her relations with all states and concentrate on peaceful internal economic development.

As a result of the 1954 Geneva Conference settlement on Indochina which the Chinese leaders helped to shape, China's state interests were advantaged by: (1) the establishment of a Communist North Vietnam on her southern flank, and (2) the creation of weak states in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, where it seemed then that, by peaceful means, further Communist gains could be consolidated and Western influence completely removed.

THE BANDUNG FORMULA

In April, 1955, Communist China scored a major diplomatic triumph at the Bandung Conference, attended by leaders from 29

Afro-Asian nations. The significance of China's participation at the Conference was underscored by the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were excluded. Furthermore, China's attendance demonstrated that she had broken loose from the United States effort to isolate her politically in Asia.

The extent of China's independence from the Soviet Union was also revealed by Chou En-lai's statements at the Conference, some of which seemed to preempt Soviet leadership on the question of Communist bloc policy toward non-aligned countries.

At Bandung, Chou En-lai advanced a formula governing China's relations with her Asian neighbors, which the Chinese leaders believed they could turn into a peaceful but forward strategy. China pledged to live with her neighbors, respecting different social systems, and to refrain from interfering in their internal affairs. Chou En-lai maintained that despite ideological differences Afro-Asian countries, including China, could be united in their common "struggle against imperialism."⁶ In effect the Chinese offered to renounce an active role in advancing Communist revolution abroad if Asian countries would cooperate with Chinese leadership in exerting political pressure on the United States and other Western powers to withdraw from the Far East.

After 1956, however, the Bandung formula proved to be successful only in relations with those countries in Asia which did not decisively affect China's aspirations for pre-eminence; countries like Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

As a case in point, China has not interfered in Burma's internal political life and, in 1961, concluded a boundary agreement with Burma, on terms considered generally favorable to the Burmese. For her part, Burma's foreign policy has adhered closely to positions that respect China's broad strategic and political interest on such questions as the Sino-Indian dispute, and foreign military and economic assistance.

Cambodia (whose chief of state, Prince Sihanouk, appreciates better than most what

⁵ See *Sino-Indian Agreement on Intercourse between the Tibetan Region of China and India*, April 29, 1954. Reprinted by the New China News Agency (Peking), April 30, 1954.

⁶ See *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), pp. 21-27.

is required of small neighbors seeking to accommodate resurgent Chinese power) did not establish relations with Peking until 1958 but has likewise consistently deferred to China, in the full recognition that if North Vietnam's ambition to incorporate Cambodia is to be checked, China's friendship is indispensable.

In April, 1955, China concluded a dual nationality treaty with Indonesia which for the first time recognized the right of Chinese born abroad to take foreign citizenship. Despite Indonesia's subsequent persecution of Chinese nationals in 1959-1960, Peking has repeatedly acceded to the arbitrary nature of the Indonesians on this question and, moreover, has given them economic assistance and political support. For Indonesia, unlike India, has emerged as the model of the kind of non-alignment the Bandung line was designed to encourage on an Asia-wide scale. From Peking's point of view, Indonesia is the only non-Communist Asian nation which, since 1957, has consistently pursued an active "anti-imperialist policy," weakening the Western powers, and thereby indirectly supporting China's ambitions.

In the vital areas such as Japan, India, and Indochina, where China must succeed if her preeminence in the Far East is to be established, the Bandung formula failed from the beginning to promote decisive reorientations away from the West and toward an acceptance of Chinese leadership. To a large extent the Bandung formula failed because United States and Soviet policies, though in part differently motivated, undermined those of China. In the Chinese view both Soviet and United States policies toward Japan, India, and Indochina since late 1955 have been designed to promote the strengthening of resistance to Chinese influence. Peking expected United States moves to counter her strategy, but the unfolding of Soviet opposition to China does not appear to have been expected when the Chinese created the Bandung formula.

THE SOVIET ROLE

China's resentment of Soviet Far Eastern policies may well have begun in 1956 when

the Russians extended large-scale assistance to India, Burma, and Indonesia, evidently with a view to establishing Russian competition with China, as well as with the United States. Furthermore, by recognizing Japan in 1956, and subsequently pursuing an independent policy toward her, the Soviet Union in effect undermined the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty, under which the two powers had followed a common policy of denying recognition pending Japan's reorientation away from the United States and her establishment of relations with Peking. Soviet criticism of China's stand in the dispute with India, as early as 1959, convinced the Chinese leaders that Russian Far Eastern policy was directed against China.

It has been increasingly clear to the Chinese leaders that, in Indochina also, Soviet policies are at cross purposes with their own. At no time since 1956 has there been really strong Soviet opposition to the policies of the United States there.

The United States refused to accept an Indochina solution (based on control by Communist and weak neutralist states under strong Chinese influence) which the French defeat and the 1954 Geneva Conference Agreements appeared to insure; would not sign the Geneva Agreements; and, subsequently sought to block further expansion of Chinese influence by creating SEATO and undertaking economic and military assistance programs to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

The Soviet Union did extend limited assistance to the North Vietnamese Communists when they resumed revolutionary tactics in South Vietnam and Laos in 1959, following political setbacks in both countries as a result of pursuing non-violent tactics. However, following the July, 1962, Geneva Accords ostensibly neutralizing Laos and the intensification of Communist insurgency in South Vietnam, support of the Communist fortunes in Indochina noticeably declined as the Russians became aware that the real beneficiary of possible Communist takeovers in either Laos or South Vietnam would be Peking, not Moscow.

CHINA AND JAPAN

As early as 1954, Chou En-lai told visiting Japanese Diet members that China wanted to establish relations with Japan and to conclude a peace treaty but that these steps required a genuinely independent Japan (namely, a loosening of ties with the United States). As applied to Japan after 1955, the Bandung formula called for an end to ideological attacks on the Japanese government coupled with offers to solve outstanding problems relating to trade, the repatriation of Japanese prisoners-of-war, and fishing rights, on condition that diplomatic relations be restored.

Strong political and economic pressures developed in Japan for normalizing relations with China, but they were never sufficient to sway the government on crucial issues. The Japanese government proved beyond question that China's efforts to normalize relations were of secondary importance to Japan and could be ignored when, in 1958, it denied the first official Chinese trade mission permission to fly the Chinese People's Republic flag and, in 1960, despite considerable internal opposition, renegotiated the Japan-United States defense treaty.

Both actions, predictably, brought forth virulent Chinese opposition. Her present and future interest in procuring capital goods and possibly credit from Japan, now that the Soviet bloc has proven an unreliable ally, has forced China to accept unofficial trade and political contacts in terms that are set, essentially, by the Japanese. Whenever the Chinese leaders determine that their contacts with Tokyo are expendable, Japan's entire relationship with the United States would become the target of renewed Chinese pressure.

RELATIONS WITH INDIA

India's confidence that she had both Soviet and United States support well in hand sealed the Nehru government's decision militarily to resist Chinese seizure of disputed territory along the Tibetan-Indian frontier in 1959, rather than negotiate a less satisfactory compromise reflecting India's inferior position.

However, the Chinese leaders evidently did not abandon all hope of securing concessions from the Indian side until Nehru, on October 12, 1962, gave the command to drive the Chinese out of the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA). In a counterattack, the Chinese overran Indian military positions and took possession of most of the disputed territory in the NEFA and Ladakh. On November 21, Peking proposed a ceasefire and a 12.5 mile withdrawal, proposals which were unilaterally implemented on December 1, 1962, before any significant international support could crystallize on India's behalf.

The political significance of this border war for China's policies toward her other neighbors emerged when, on October 27, Peking published "More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question," the foundation of a sustained ideological war against the Indian leadership and its foreign and domestic policies. In launching ideological war on India, Peking served notice on her neighbors that the Indian brands of non-alignment and opposition to China's preeminence were policies that carried grave risks for those adopting them.

The political isolation of India began to unfold when not one of her surrounding neighbors echoed New Delhi's charges of "Chinese aggression." China further consolidated her political position against India by the conclusion of a "provisional" boundary agreement with Pakistan on March 2, 1963, followed by the first Sino-Pakistan trade pact and agreement to establish a commercial air link, both signed in December of that year. These accords have significance because they portend possible long-range Sino-Pakistan cooperation to outflank India and further reduce her influence.

Similarly, in Nepal, the Chinese continue to give Nepal economic assistance and to construct the road that will ultimately link Lhasa with Katmandu. Both actions unquestionably strengthen Peking's position in the Himalayan border states vis-à-vis India.

FOCUS ON INDOCHINA

Her preeminence established along the

Indian frontier, China's attention since 1963 has focused on the neighboring states comprising Indochina. For nine years, as the Chinese leaders see it, these states have watched with concern (and currently with alarm) United States efforts to strengthen the 1954 Geneva Conference settlement by helping to create viable non-Communist regimes in South Vietnam and Laos.

Since 1955 the Chinese government has consistently condemned such political developments contrary to their interest as: (1) United States military and economic support of South Vietnam; (2) the former Diem government's refusal to hold elections in 1956 unifying North and South Vietnam which the 1954 Geneva settlement called for; and (3) United States support of Laotian rightist and neutralist leadership in the political and military struggle to curb Pathet Lao domination of that country.

Available evidence indicates, however, that the major impetus behind the revolutionary action in Laos and South Vietnam comes from North Vietnam, whose state interests would be advanced by communizing this area. Peking, whose state interests do not require communizing of Southeast Asia, could accept "neutralist" states in Laos, and probably South Vietnam as well, provided their political coloration was similar to Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia.

As North Vietnam has pressed violent revolution in both Laos and South Vietnam since the 1962 Geneva accords, direct United States involvement has also increased. In the absence of clear Soviet support for North Vietnam and its protégés, the Chinese leaders have indicated that they will accept certain risks inherent in supporting North Vietnam rather than default on strategically placed allies or jeopardize their political position in the whole area by appearing to retreat before United States power. But Chinese statements indicate that their support of North Vietnam's actions is by no means unconditional. Communist China appears to be less concerned

about the fate of the counterinsurgency in South Vietnam and more about the defense of the North Vietnamese state in the event of a direct threat to its security by the United States.

As this article is being written, the Chinese government has expressed alarm over the situation in Laos where the coalition government collapsed on April 19, 1964, following sustained Pathet Lao military pressures designed to enforce acceptance of Communist demands on the neutralist-rightist dominated cabinet. Laos is presently in a state of *de facto* partition between the Communist Pathet Lao (actively supported by North Vietnam) and neutralist-rightist forces largely dependent on the United States.

The Chinese government has officially called for another 14-nation conference on Laos, and no longer regards the Souvanna Phouma government as legitimate.⁷ An outright Communist Laos is not essential to the interests of the Chinese state. But her interests, as the present leadership seems to appraise them, do require that Communist gains be preserved in some form, and more important, that the United States should not emerge from any settlement in a position to influence events in Laos contrary to China's wishes.

What has emerged since 1959 is really two rather broad but distinct Chinese policies towards her neighbors: the Bandung line carried on in relations with those states which seek political accommodation with the Chinese state and do not join with either the Soviet Union or the United States to frustrate China, and a line emphasizing *political warfare* towards countries like India, Japan,

(Continued on page 180)

David P. Mozingo is a specialist on Communist China at The RAND Corporation. After military service as a Chinese interpreter-translator, Mr. Mozingo completed graduate studies at U.C.L.A. and further training in Indonesian language and political affairs at Cornell University. He was recently awarded a Ford Foundation grant for field research in Hong Kong and Indonesia.

⁷ See *Chinese Government Statement on the Laotian Situation*, June 9, 1964, from the *Peking Review*, June 12, 1964, pp. 6-7.

"There has been a period of general enrichment in Taiwan, so that Nationalist China (along with Japan and Malaysia) is one of the three most prosperous countries in all Asia," notes this specialist, who points out that "In contrast, the great leap sideways on the mainland . . . presents the mainland government with the spectre of starvation. . . ."

The Two Chinas

By PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

Professor of Asiatic Politics,

School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

THE MOST UNSETTLING factor on the Chinese scene is the presence of two different Chinese governments, each claiming to be the only "China" and each possessing strong military forces and vivid political leadership. Transcending the vulgarized Western conception of Chinese "face," there is a deep level of feeling in both the Chinese governments that identity itself is at stake. What is involved is not only power and prestige abroad but the feeling, even at home, that one is oneself. This explains the strange vehemence with which both the Peking government and the Taipei government insist that there is only one China, unique and indivisible. The threat to the mainland does not solely consist of Chiang having forces or promising a Chinese "Normandy" someday. The threat is deeper: the Republic of China still exists.¹

There is no chance whatever that Peking will conquer Taiwan in the face of the United States defense pact with the Republic. If nuclear power were invoked, it is probably true (as an indiscreet newspaperman

told the present writer two years ago) that the United States Seventh Fleet could destroy all the key military and industrial areas of mainland China nine times over without sending back to the United States for a single additional bomb.

The strategic facts are therefore simple. Nationalist China will exist as long as Washington keeps its present policy. Even if the United States were the only government on earth to recognize the Republic of China, the People's Republic could not obliterate its rival in the face of the United States-Republic of China defense agreement unless Washington gave up its pledge. To the Chinese Communist mentality, which rejoices in dogmas so complex as to leave even its fellow Communists spinning, the conclusion is simple: Washington must be destroyed. Not physically, of course (though that might happen later), but morally, politically, sentimentally and ideologically.

In actual fact, nothing much has happened for some years. The United States armed forces in the Far East operate very near Chinese Communist forces, but not a plane has been shot down, not a ship sunk, not a man wounded. The Chinese Communists have plenty of what the nuclear war experts call "credibility" on the subject of American power. For 130-odd months, since the Korean armistice, they have spewed filth and hatred at the United States through any radio

¹ For an earlier but still valid statement of this peculiarly Chinese kind of confrontation, the author cites for the record his own "Taipei and Peking: The Confronting Republics" in *The Journal of International Affairs*, vol. XI, no. 2 (New York, 1957), pp. 135-142. The basic situation has not changed in the past seven years. The writer has visited Nationalist China twice since 1957 and reports that the underlying contradiction of "two governments in one China" remains the key political and moral problem of the area.

at their command, but have avoided firing a single bullet which might hit any member of the United States military. They have some idea of the physical military power which the United States possesses in the Far East—namely, total power—and they are literally afraid to meet it.

Nationalist China is therefore protected by a Washington connection which is sometimes embarrassing to Taipei in talking to the Chinese on Taiwan, the Chinese overseas, or the Chinese on the mainland. However, the Republic of China has been careful to discourage anti-American sentiment and to keep the Washington connection as smooth and as trouble-free as possible. In this, Taipei is more prudent than Peking, because Taipei stays under the American nuclear umbrella while Peking risks getting out from under the Russian one.

If Washington changes its mind, change in China would seem inevitable. Peking and Taipei confront each other; Moscow and Washington also confront each other; perhaps Peking would like to see the two largest powers of the world destroy each other to give Red China hegemony over the whole earth. This piece of Walter Mitty daydreaming would seem absurd except for the fact that it exists and expresses itself in the hysterical flood of Red Chinese propaganda against the Moscow-Washington nuclear test ban agreement, among other things. In short, the strategy of "two Chinas" begins and ends in Washington, D. C. As long as the Washington-Taipei connection remains firm, nothing much is going to happen, save for a chance of suffering and subsequently mutiny on the mainland or the total abandonment of Communist China by the Soviet Union.

SINO-CHINESE RELATIONS

Actual, physical relations between the two Chinas are at an absolute minimum, despite a steady stream of British newspaper fabrications to the effect that the two sets of Chinese authorities are going to make a deal with one another. There is, of course, a little indirect trade with one another through Hongkong, but communications are practically nil. The

writer need cite only one example. A major personality in the Nationalist regime, close to the Generalissimo and to General Chiang Chiang-kuo, has not been able to find anyone who can tell him whether his ex-wife and two almost-grown sons are still alive in Kweichow province. The boycott on communications is so severe that very little information except professional-quality espionage gets through.

With the de Gaulle recognition of Peking, things have deteriorated somewhat for Nationalist China on the diplomatic front, but they have changed for the better on many other fronts. Economically, Nationalist China has conciliated the local citizenry with a piece of social engineering almost completely overlooked in the American press: the creation of a lively, confident local Chinese capitalist class under state supervision. The capitalists were and are ex-landlords who were paid for their latifundia with money bonds and commodity bonds, as well as with stock in companies which had been government property under the Japanese but which the Nationalist regime could trade to the important local citizens for the sake of obtaining peace on the island. There, the ruling class, militarily and politically, comprises mainland Chinese (with a few notable exceptions of local Taiwan provincials near the top of the government), but the economically prevailing class is mostly local Taiwanese.

There has been a period of general enrichment in Taiwan, so that Nationalist China (along with Japan and Malaysia) is one of the three most prosperous countries in all Asia. For contrast, the great leap sideways on the mainland, following the failure of the "great leap forward," presents the mainland government with the spectre of starvation, the importation of foreign foods merely to keep the people alive, and the very Chinese danger that some one event within mainland China might turn an avalanche of people against the regime. The more they fail at home, the more provocative the Peking leaders become in their foreign policy. Thus, Peking is driven to playing the game of hobgoblin on the international scene because

there are not enough real accomplishments on the mainland.

THE OUTSIDE WORLD AS A REFEREE

Each of the Chinese governments is fighting for something more than a few thousand square kilometers of battlefield or a few hundred million people. Each is fighting for belief in itself.

The Nationalists have scored some solid advances in this field within the last two years. The presidential succession, in the event of the death of President Chiang Kai-shek, lies firmly in the hands of Vice President Ch'en Ch'eng, who has taken good care to identify himself with the largely successful and highly productive land reforms. These are now phasing to a successful close, transforming a country of peasants into a country of land-owning farmers. The reforms have been so successful that United States economic aid to Nationalist China has been cut off completely. This has occurred at the very time when it would require more aid than all of the world's aid programs put together to allow the Chinese Communist regime to give its people, in the 1960's, anything like the world which the Communist leaders in the 1950's promised within "a short time."

The people on the mainland might have been prepared for present conditions if the Peking regime had promised them 100 years of sacrifice, poverty and war, but the worst enemies of the Mao regime are Mao and his friends. In Hongkong, Taiwan and Japan one hears that there is not much anti-Communist sentiment on the mainland yet, but that cynicism, selfishness, loss of zeal and corruption are increasing at a measurable rate.

Since the people of neither China get unbiased news about domestic difficulties in the other China, both governments tend to use the actions of foreign powers and the foreign press as barometers of Chinese success or failure. The recognition of one Chinese government or the other becomes an important indicator. The Nationalists for example, were

cheered when two ex-British states, Jamaica and Sierra Leone (which normally follow the British policy of recognizing Peking), gave their recognition to Taipei instead. Others may follow.

Beneath this international struggle, which is fought partly for its international effects but more particularly to give the people and leaders of each jurisdiction confidence in themselves as "China," an interesting pattern of developments has arisen—one singularly ignored in the Western press. The Nationalists or Kuomintang struggled as conspirators and revolutionaries for more than 30 years before they took over the government in 1928, but today they use formal diplomatic weapons very smoothly and suavely. They have excellent ambassadors, knowledgeable diplomatic staffs and a young, vigorous foreign minister, Shen Chang-huan, to direct the effort.

The Communists, on the other hand, who clamor so loudly for recognition, make very poor use of it; with only two or three exceptions, their ambassadors are frightened mediocrities who spy on their own staffs while being spied on themselves. In the field of informal international activities—bribery, forgery of newspapers, subversion of youth and friendship groups, the use of saboteurs and assassins—the Communists are doing well.

THE EXAMPLE OF JAPAN

Japan presents a significant case study in Chinese foreign relations. Japan is close to China and important to China for long-standing historical reasons.² The Japanese have been repeatedly wooed by Peking with easy passports, repeated trade delegations, and invitations to do more business. Yet each time, the Chinese Communists have frustrated their own efforts by demanding Japanese agreement with Peking on its world-view or on Maoist theory. Peking thinks that the masses of the Japanese people, including some of the big manufacturers, really hate the United States for its economic "oppression." This is simply untrue. There are some anti-American groups in Japan, and a larger body of Japanese opinion, which is unenthusiastic about the United States, but the majority of

² Note the introduction to Paul F. Langer, "Japan's Relations with China," in *Current History*, v. 46, no. 272 (April, 1964), p. 193.

Japanese, as shown in repeated elections, have voted freely for governments committed to both economic cooperation and security arrangements with the United States.

When Peking must choose between an actual fact, and something else which *ought* (in Mao Tse-tung's theoretical view) to be a fact, the *ought* always wins over the *is*. Thus the Peking Chinese are driven to wilder and wilder hallucinations as the picture of the world in which they believe departs from the picture they would get if they viewed events and people as they actually are. Operating in this virtual fantasy world, Peking leaders demand that Japan risk good relations with the United States, risk losing United States trade, risk its own national unity, in order to "recognize" Peking. Relations between the Nationalist Chinese and Japan are handled more diplomatically. The Republic of China does more business with Japan than does the People's Republic. With high prosperity and a reasonable government, little Formosa has more credit and better credit on the international business market than does the teeming mainland, with its seven or eight hundred million people, its useless armies and its poor trade balance.

A recent crisis illustrates Nationalist Chinese diplomacy. Relations between Taipei and Tokyo reached a low ebb when the Japanese allowed a Chinese Communist defector to change his mind and go home to mainland China on December 31, 1963. By mid-February, the Chinese Nationalists threatened to withdraw their ambassador from Tokyo, which they did, and the Japanese counter-threatened to send an "official" visitor to Peking, which they did not do. During this period, Japan did everything it could to keep trade with the mainland open while keeping its trade with Taiwan as well. The Japanese allowed the holding of a Chinese Communist trade fair in Tokyo during April, but they gave diplomatic status to none of the persons concerned. By June the situation had almost returned to normal—in favor of Taipei.

The two jurisdictions of China depend on the two great nuclear powers, Moscow and Washington. Peking is quarrelling with Mos-

cow and trying to quarrel with Washington too, except that Washington has sense enough, most of the time, not to answer the Peking diatribes. Whether this quarrelling will have any long-range effect remains to be seen. Militarily, if the mainland regime attacks United States armed forces at any level or at any location, it will be beaten, even should Taiwan come to its aid. However, that possibility lies in the future and is a political question too complex to be given a brief accounting. But even counting the two Chinas as one, China is not a great power.

On the other hand, what would Taiwan do if Peking provoked Moscow too much, and if the Russians were to occupy East Turkestan in Central Asia? Or if divided Mongolia ceased to be divided and, with a little Russian help, added Chinese-occupied Inner Mongolia to Mongol-ruled Outer Mongolia? As military operations, neither of these maneuvers would strain the Soviet forces much, and it would certainly be ridiculous to expect that United States nuclear missiles would be used to defend Comrade Mao against Comrade Khrushchev. Where would Taiwan stand?

While Moscow-Washington relations improve, while Moscow-Peking relations worsen, while Washington-Taipei relations remain firm and unchanged, the uncertain part of the China equation depends not on Nationalist China but on Communist China. On its leaders and their mistakes, particularly their mistakes, hinges China's next decade.

Paul M. A. Linebarger has taught at many colleges and universities and has been a frequent consultant to various government agencies. He has lived in the Far East intermittently since 1919 and was Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University of Canberra in 1957. Among his numerous books on the Far East are: *Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937) and *Far Eastern Governments and Politics* (2nd edition, Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956).

How significant is "the reported orientation of Chinese trade away from the Soviet bloc and toward the Western world"? Calling attention to the fact that "trade statistics themselves are somewhat deceiving unless care is taken to allow for certain special circumstances," this specialist nonetheless concludes that "... in a sense, the prospect of Communist China's continued economic recovery ... must be predicated upon Western cooperation. ..."

China's Economy and Its Prospects

By YUAN-LI WU

Professor of International Business, University of San Francisco

IN A REVIEW of Communist China's economic development in 1962 printed in the September, 1963, issue of this journal, two principal determinants of Chinese economic recovery were singled out for attention. These were (1) the continuation of agricultural recovery, to be followed by the resumption of large investment in the industrial sector, and (2) the ability of the Communist regime to manage, through a judicious import program and technological innovations and improvements at home, to break through the "bottleneck of transformation" which would enable the economy to convert savings into capital goods of the kinds required for industrial and agricultural expansion. The passage of the last 12 months has yielded sufficient new information to make a reassessment of the situation worthwhile.

Two principal sets of data became available during the fourth session of the Second National People's Congress and after its close on December 3, 1963. The first is an enumeration of the seven economic objectives set for 1964; the second is an account of the régime's economic successes in 1963. These should be considered together if we wish to gain a balanced view of the accomplishments

and problems confronting Communist China today.

In its New Year's editorial in 1964, the official *People's Daily* stated that the seven major economic tasks in the current year were to be (1) further improvement in agricultural production, including both food grains and industrial crops, (2) increase in industrial output subject to the requirement of technological and qualitative improvements, as well as increase in the variety of products, (3) strengthening of capital constructions in the basic and defense industries and in irrigation and water conservancy projects, (4) further improvement in the management of enterprises in which especial attention should be given to the reduction of cost and material inputs and increase in labor productivity, (5) expansion of trade between urban and rural areas so that "further appropriate improvements in the living standard of the population" would be accomplished, (6) strengthening of scientific research, education, and public health undertakings, and (7) tightening of financial and banking controls in order to mobilize savings and increase government revenue and funds for capital accumulation.

A comparison of this list with the policy directives of 1961 and 1962¹ would show the identity of most of the seven objectives

¹ See Yuan-li Wu, "Industrial Development in China," *Current History*, September, 1963, pp. 173-174.

with the earlier policy guidelines. The latter had marked the reorientation of economic policy by calling for a new order of priorities with emphasis on agriculture, "light industry," and "heavy industry" in diminishing order of importance. At the same time, emphasis was shifted from quantity production to quality improvement, technological innovation, and the faithful observance of the "economic accounting" system. Continuation of the same policy in 1964 can be seen in the call for further improvements in agricultural and industrial production, the strengthening of management practices, and the enlargement of the production of goods.

On the other hand, the seven objectives listed also point to some new twists. Perhaps the innocent-sounding warning that financial and banking controls should be tightened and the hint that some appropriate improvement in the living standard of the people would be aimed at are among the more important indications of emerging new conditions and problems. The same may be said of the objective of strengthening constructions in the defense industry. However, both the continuation of the objectives set two years earlier and the possible new departures must be evaluated in terms of the reported accomplishments during 1963.

REPORTED SUCCESSES IN 1963

The National People's Congress was told by the Party leaders in November, 1963, that "China's national economic plans for 1963 were completely fulfilled and over-fulfilled." This sweeping announcement was, however, modified by the following statement:

Developments in *varying degrees* [italics mine] were registered in agriculture, industry, communications and transport, capital construction, commerce, finance, science, culture, education, and national defense. China's national economy began to show an over-all turn for the better.

The general statement of an over-all "turn for the better" may be broken down further. First, in agriculture, grain production was re-

ported to have increased over the 1962 level although the exact extent of improvement was not reported. On the other hand, a one-third increase in the output of raw cotton in 1963 over the preceding year was reported. Furthermore, according to the same source, there were certain improvements in agricultural mechanization and in the production of chemical fertilizers while rural consumption of electric power had risen. Inasmuch as industrial production was supposed to aid agricultural recovery, the developments in fertilizer and agricultural machine production and rural electrification could be considered as an indication of success of this policy to some degree.

In addition, it was also mentioned time and again in the official press that Communist China had, during 1963, become for the first time "by and large" self-sufficient in the supply of petroleum products. A Japanese report has placed Chinese crude production in 1963 at 7.6 million tons against an import of 2.4 million tons.² Still another measure of economic success was reported in December, 1963, to the effect that repayment on the outstanding balance of the Soviet loan was made well ahead of time. This was supported by the statement that the foreign trade plans of the country were also over-fulfilled for 1963. Finally, according to the Peking *Ta-kung Pao*, the country's industrial designing work was brought to a much higher plane during 1963, thus indicating some progress in the all-important technological aspect of industrial production and construction of new plants.

EVIDENCE OF SLOW RECOVERY

To those students of Communist Chinese affairs who have followed Chinese reporting methods closely in the past, the announcement of an increase in grain output, devoid of specific figures, indicates a relatively small improvement, possibly limited to some farm crops and geographical areas only. As a matter of fact, some Western estimates have put Communist China's food grain production in 1963 at 179 million tons³ which, though somewhat greater than the estimated

² Cabinet Research Office, Japan.

³ Estimate derived from correspondence with Mr. Owen L. Dawson, former U.S. Agricultural Attaché to China.

output for 1962, would still be below the normal trend level. On the other hand, the reported increase in the output of cotton and other industrial crops was probably genuine and, in some instances, fairly substantial.

As for agricultural machinery and implements, although the 20 per cent increase reported for 1963 was ostensibly large, it would actually make very little difference to the total availability of tractors and other farm equipment. As pointed out in the September, 1963, issue of this journal, the increase in the production of the agricultural machinery industry was probably to a large extent composed of repair and replacement. Similarly, although the reported 39 per cent increase in chemical fertilizer production would put the 1963 output at nearly 2.8 million tons,⁴ a substantial increase over the reported 1962 level of 2 million tons, it would still be no greater than the target which had been originally set for 1960. Only the 30 per cent greater rural consumption of electric power could be regarded as a net increment over rural electrification in the previous year. However, it would have no appreciable effect on the absolute size of the acreage that can be irrigated with electrically operated pumping facilities.

All in all, therefore, improvements in the agricultural sector indicate a continuation of the trend that began in 1962. While the upturn that initiated the slow recovery has continued, it has not gathered speed and must still be attributed largely to benefits reaped from the relaxation of the rigorous regimen in the commune and the making good of agricultural disinvestment in the preceding years. The technological revolution of agriculture that was to be ushered in by chemicalization, mechanization, and electrification simply has not yet had time to make a real mark in the fabric of traditional agriculture.

⁴ Data based on Japanese studies. The same has been estimated by O. L. Dawson to be 2.6 million tons.

⁵ Cabinet Research Office, Japan.

⁶ New China News Agency, Peking, December 28 and 29, 1963.

⁷ See Colma MacDougall, "Finding the Gusher," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, No. 65, March 26, 1964, Hong Kong, p. 658.

Evidence of this situation may be found in the continued import not only of chemical fertilizers and chemical fertilizer plants, but also in imports of food grain. According to one source, the reported foreign exchange commitment for food imports, not all of which has been paid, was in the order of magnitude of \$290 million in 1963, \$338 million in 1962, and \$340 million in 1961.⁵ Grain import has continued in the current year.

The 1963 year-end reports were also replete with good tidings from individual enterprises,⁶ including the Anshan steel mill, chemical plants in Shanghai, the production of consumers' goods in Tientsin, coal output from Liaoning province, machine production in the Shen-yang plants, and many others. However, absence of aggregate output figures and the sporadic nature of reports of over-fulfillment of production quotas lend support to the view that industrial recovery has been mostly spotty.

BOTTLENECKS AND BREAKTHROUGHS

Given time, would the slow but continued recovery of agricultural production and the spotty improvements in industry automatically and inexorably, as it were, lead to an over-all recovery and resumption of economic growth? The nature of the answer to this question may be illustrated by a particular instance—the reported discovery of new petroleum deposits in Manchuria—which points not only to the possibility that bottlenecks in industrial production could be broken through, but also to the conditions under which successful exploitation of such break-throughs can be expected.

According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the possibility of exporting petroleum to Japan was explored by a Chinese visitor to Japan in early 1964.⁷ There were also reports that Chinese officials in Canton had rather optimistically mentioned the possibility of exporting up to one million tons of crude oil in 1964 and up to ten million tons in 1965. The large oil field in question was said to have been surveyed by the Russians and to have been further developed by the Chinese. One may question the accuracy of

these optimistic figures. Yet the fact remains that if the newly discovered oil should really be in the order of magnitude mentioned in these reports, Communist China would be in a much better economic position from the point of view of economic development, and of trade negotiations with the Soviet Union, because Communist China has had to depend upon Soviet oil for domestic consumption during the last decade and a half.

However, it should be realized that an increase in the supply of crude would not automatically mean an expansion of the supply of refined petroleum products. A secondary bottleneck would consist of the availability of refining equipment. That the Chinese Communists apparently are taking steps to solve this problem may be seen in another report of Communist China's interest in French equipment.⁸ Chinese petroleum engineers are said to have visited France and Algeria specifically to study French petroleum engineering and the possibility of purchasing French equipment. In this respect, France's recognition of Communist China assumes new importance. In a much broader context, however, we are brought back to the basic question, whether the specialized equipment Communist China needs can be made available through import so long as it cannot be produced at home.

REORIENTATION OF CHINESE TRADE?

One must consider, in this connection, the reported reorientation of Chinese trade away from the Soviet bloc and toward the Western world.

If we take the volume of Soviet exports to

Communist China in 1960 as 100, the index in 1961 and 1962 would be 45 and 28.6 respectively.⁹ The continued decline of Soviet exports during these two years following the sharp curtailment and cancellation of Soviet aid to Communist China in 1960, as well as the withdrawal of nearly 1,400 Soviet specialists from China,¹⁰ has occasioned speculation that Communist China has adopted a deliberate policy to reorient her external purchases away from the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. To what extent has such a reorientation really occurred, and what would be its full potential if it has indeed taken place?

The trade statistics themselves are somewhat deceiving unless care is taken to allow for certain special circumstances. The decline of Soviet exports to Communist China in 1960-1962 was doubtless substantial, and no one would dispute the significance of a total decline of 71.4 per cent in 1960-1962. However, one should bear in mind that the decline was a reflection of the cutback in Soviet aid and a result of Chinese attempts to build up an export surplus in order to accelerate the repayment of previous Soviet aid. In other words, as long as Communist China was required to repay Soviet loans, while no new loans were forthcoming, it would be necessary to reduce import from the Soviet Union and to create a surplus of Chinese exports. On the other hand, the decision to repay Soviet loans at a pace that was probably faster than necessary may have been prompted by changing relations with the Soviet Union. The same circumstances might induce Communist China to reorient her trade away from the Soviet Union, but such a reorientation must be looked for in a significant increase in trade with the West, rather than a decline of trade with the Soviet Union.

According to the trade statistics of free world countries, during the same period, exports from the free world to Communist China increased from an index of 100 in 1960 to 110.9 in 1961, an increase followed by a slight decline to 95.2 in 1962, and 97.7 in 1963.¹¹ Compared with the decline of

⁸ See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, No. 56, January 23, 1964, p. 145.

⁹ Derived from *Vneshniaia Torgovlia*, statistical supplement, Moscow, 1961 and 1962.

¹⁰ The number of Soviet specialists withdrawn in 1960 was given in an open letter dated February 29, 1964, published in Peking in May, 1964. Reported in *The New York Times*, May 9, 1964.

¹¹ Thanks are due to the International Trade Analysis Division of the Bureau of International Commerce, United States Department of Commerce, which has very kindly provided the author with some of the 1963 statistics. See also *The Battle Act Report*, 1963, Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, 16th Report to Congress, Department of State, December, 1963.

Soviet exports to Communist China during 1960-1962, one might gain a distinct impression that there has already been a large re-orientation of Chinese trade toward the West. However, Communist China was compelled to reverse her previous policy toward food import during this period. Large annual imports of food grains were reported in 1961-1963, and continued imports are indicated in 1964. Since the Soviet bloc had no food grain to export and Communist China had to make these short-run "emergency" purchases in free world countries, a more accurate indication of the degree of real trade reorientation should be obtained by excluding the grain imports.

If this is done for the years 1961-1963, with 1960 as 100, the index of the free world's exports to Communist China in 1961 would be 60 while the corresponding indices in 1962 and 1963 would be 44.7 and 54.3 respectively. These adjusted figures would still, of course, constitute a distinctly slower decline of non-food imports from the free world in 1960-1962 in comparison with imports from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, lack of statistics on trade with the Soviet Union in 1963 precludes a clear comparison. However, even after the slight increase in non-food imports from the free world in 1963 compared with 1962, the index was still well below the level which had been reached in the four years before 1960.¹² See figure I.

The index of Chinese exports to the Soviet Union was 65 in 1961 and 60.9 in 1962 (1960 = 100). In the same period, Chinese exports to the free world fell from the same base year to 83.1 in 1961 and 78.1 in 1962; an increase of the index to 98.4 was registered in 1962-1963. However, it should be noted in this connection that many Chinese exports to the free world went to Hong Kong and Malaya. Since a large proportion of the population at both places is of Chinese descent, it is possible for Communist China to

export to these area consumers' goods of every description which could not otherwise be exported without serious marketing difficulties. If exports to Hong Kong and Malaya are subtracted from total Chinese exports to the free world, using 1960 as the base year, there would be a decline to 79.9 in 1960-1961 and 67.3 in 1961-1962. The increase in exports in 1962-1963 would bring the index up to 84.9, which was, however, only slightly higher than the 1956 index of 83. See figure II.


The above exercise serves to bring to light several important points. First, a great deal of the increase in exports from the free world to Communist China in 1961 and the relative increase in comparison with exports from the Soviet Union during 1962 and 1963 consisted of food exports. Secondly, the relative increase in exports from Communist China to the free world during the same period was largely concentrated in exports to Hong Kong and Malaya. In the circumstances, let us suppose that Communist China was successful during the next few years in removing the need to import food. Would the foreign exchange thus freed be available for the importation of other goods from the free world? If trade with the free world were to be expanded beyond the present level (including food import), would it be possible to expand Chinese exports further so that the still larger imports could be financed?

Communist China obviously cannot limit the expansion of her exports to areas which have a concentration of Chinese residents. Yet any large expansion of exports to other areas would have to be predicated upon the development of new products and new marketing techniques. It is entirely possible that the inelasticity of demand for Chinese exports would set a limit to the possibility of importing more goods from the free world. Additional Chinese exports which could be diverted to the free world would come from three sources: (a) exports which are at present used to pay back outstanding Soviet loans that might be liquidated by the end of 1964 or 1965, (b) exports which are at present used to finance food imports, and (c) in-


¹² Chinese imports from the free world had shown a marked increase after 1956 following the relaxation of COCOM controls in that year. The index of non-food imports in 1956 would be 64.9 (1960 = 100) and that in 1958 would be 115.2, in comparison with 54.3 in 1963.

FIGURE I: INDEX OF SOVIET AND FREE WORLD EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST CHINA
(1960 value = 100)

Key: - - - - Free World Exports to Communist China (including food grains)
 — Free World Exports to Communist China (excluding food grains)
 Soviet Exports to Communist China
 * at 1960 indicates Soviet curtailment of economic aid and technical assistance.

**FIGURE II: INDEX OF SOVIET AND FREE WORLD IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST CHINA**
(1960 value = 100)

Key: - - - - Free World Imports from Communist China (excluding Hong Kong and Malaya)
 — Free World Imports from Communist China
 Soviet Imports from Communist China
 * at 1960 indicates Soviet curtailment of economic aid and technical assistance.



crease in exports beyond the level already reached in 1963. Food imports are at present paid for in convertible currencies earned primarily from exports to Hong Kong and Malaya. Exports to the Soviet Union have consisted mostly of food, crude materials and some manufactures. Whether it is possible to export the same kinds of goods to the free world is an open question. Thus, even if there should be a deliberate desire to reorient trade away from the Soviet Union, severe limitations may be imposed by the objective conditions of the market.

One of the principal complaints the Communist Chinese voice in their dealings with the Soviet Union is the abruptness of the cutback of Soviet aid and technical assistance in 1960. For this reason Communist China has reportedly declined Soviet overtures to resume aid and to expand Sino-Soviet trade. Chinese planners understandably do not relish the possible need to readjust their plans in order to accommodate another abrupt change of Soviet policy toward China.

If there is such a mistrust of the Soviet Union, is there any reason for us to expect Communist China to trust the Western powers more? Actually, "self-reliance" has been the main theme of Chinese economic policy since 1961. If this policy is followed, any reorientation of trade away from the Soviet Union toward the Western world would be exceedingly limited. Two outstanding exceptions may consist of (1) exports to areas such as Hong Kong and Malaya where there is a large Chinese population and (2) trade with Japan. Expansion of Chinese exports to, and imports from, Japan may be deliberately cultivated as a wedge to win political recognition and influence.

Our analysis thus points to the continuation in 1963 and early 1964 of the trend of economic recovery begun in the latter part of 1962. It also points to the difficulties which Communist China must still overcome. These difficulties are the maintenance of sustained agricultural recovery by means of the institutional changes successfully initiated in

1961-1962 and the achievement of breakthroughs in the transformation of savings into specific capital goods via import. The institutional changes are handicapped by Communist China's ideological disinclination to allow too much individual freedom and enterprise. Already, reports of increased political education and indoctrination of factory workers have appeared in the press, and trade unions have been called upon to enhance the workers' political consciousness.¹³ The same phenomenon has occurred in the commune. It is questionable, therefore, whether the institutional changes that have made agricultural recovery possible will be continued and whether any untoward change may not more than offset the limited technological improvements achieved so far.

At the same time, the possibility of technological breakthroughs is limited by the availability of domestic scientific and engineering personnel. As long as these restrictions are severe, the "transformation problem" can be solved only through import. In the long run, dependence upon imports must be abjured. Yet, in the short run, imports paid for by current exports are the only way out. Unfortunately, the expansion of imports faces the difficulty of developing exports, except for exports to a few special areas. An alternative solution would be the availability of long-term credit from the West. Thus, in a sense, the prospect of Communist China's continued economic recovery and resumption of expansion on a "self-reliant" basis must be predicated upon Western cooperation, which will probably mean cooperation from some Western powers and acquiescence from others.

Yuan-li Wu, in addition to his duties at the University of San Francisco, is a Consultant at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. Mr. Wu is the author of several books, the most recent being *Economic Development and the Use of Energy Resources in Communist China* (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1963) and a forthcoming volume, *Steel: A Study on the Industrialization of Communist China*.

¹³ See *Kung-jen Jih-pao* (Workers' Daily), Peking, December 5, 1963.

Chinese Criticism of the Soviet Union

In February, 1964, excerpts from an editorial in Hung Chi, ideological journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party, were reprinted in Peking in the daily newspaper Jenmin Jih Pao. Pertinent sections of this Chinese condemnation of the Soviet Communist party are reprinted here:

Never before has the unity of the international Communist movement been so gravely threatened as it is today when we are witnessing a deluge of modern revisionist ideology. Both internationally and inside individual parties, fierce struggles are going on between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. The international Communist movement is confronted with an unprecedentedly serious danger of a split.

It is the urgent task of the Communists, the proletariat and the revolutionary people of the world to defend the unity of the Socialist camp and of the international Communist movement.

The Communist party of China has made consistent and unremitting efforts to defend and strengthen the unity of the Socialist camp and the international Communist movement in accordance with Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary principles of the 1957 declaration and the 1960 statement. It has been and remains the unswerving position of the Chinese Communist party to hold to principle, uphold unity, eliminate differences and strengthen the struggle against our common enemy.

Ever since they embarked on the path of revisionism, the leaders of the C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] have tirelessly professed their devotion to the unity of the international Communist movement. Of late they have been particularly active in

crying for "unity." This calls to mind what Engels said 90 years ago.

"One must not allow oneself to be misled by the cry for 'unity.' Those who have this word most often on their lips are the ones who sow the most dissension. . . . The biggest sectarians and the biggest brawlers and rogues at times shout loudest for unity."

While presenting themselves as champions of unity, the leaders of the C.P.S.U. are trying to pin the label of splittism on the Chinese Communist party. In its open letter, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. says:

"The Chinese leaders are undermining the unity not only of the Socialist camp but of the entire world Communist movement, trampling on the principles of proletarian internationalism and grossly violating accepted standards of relations between fraternal parties."

And the subsequent articles published in the Soviet press have been condemning the Chinese Communists as "sectarians" and "splitters."

But what are the facts? Who is undermining the unity of the Socialist camp? Who is undermining the unity of the international Communist movement? Who is trampling on the principles of proletarian internationalism? And who is grossly violating the accepted standards of relations between fraternal parties? In other words, who are the real, out-and-out splitters?

Only when these questions are properly answered can we find the way to defend and strengthen the unity of the Socialist camp and the international Communist movement and overcome the danger of a split.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD

In order to gain a clear understanding of the nature of splittism in the present international Communist struggle and to struggle against it in the correct way, let us look back on the history of the international Communist movement over the past century or so.

The struggle between Marxism-Leninism and opportunism and between the forces defending unity and those creating splits runs through the history of the development of the Communist movement. This is the case both in individual countries and on the international plane. In this prolonged struggle, Marx, Engels and Lenin expounded the true essence of proletarian unity on a theoretical level and, by their deeds, set brilliant examples in combating opportunism, revisionism and splittism.

In 1847 Marx and Engels founded the earliest international working class organization—the Communist League. In the Communist Manifesto, which they wrote as the program of the league, Marx and Engels advanced the militant call, “Workers of all countries, unite!” and gave a systematic and profound exposition of scientific communism, thus laying the ideological basis for the unity of the international proletariat.

Throughout their lives Marx and Engels worked unremittingly for this principled unity of the international proletariat.

Lenin’s theory and practice carried Marxism to a new stage in its development—the stage of Leninism. On the basis of Marxism-Leninism, the unity of the international proletariat and the international Communist movement was further strengthened and expanded.

What does the history of the development of the international Communist movement demonstrate?

First it demonstrates that, like everything else, the international working-class move-

ment tends to divide itself in two. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is inevitably reflected in the Communist ranks.

It is inevitable that opportunism of one kind or another should arise in the course of the development of the Communist movement, that opportunists should engage in anti-Marxist-Leninist splitting activities and that Marxist-Leninists should wage struggles against opportunism and splittism. It is precisely through this struggle of opposites that Marxism-Leninism and the international working-class movement have developed. And it is also through this struggle that the international working-class movement has strengthened and consolidated its unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

Unity, struggle or even splits, and a new unity on a new basis—such is the dialectics of the development of the international working-class movement.

Secondly, the history of the international Communist movement demonstrates that in every period the struggle between the defenders of unity and the creators of splits is in essence one between Marxism-Leninism and opportunism-revisionism, between the upholders of Marxism and the traitors to Marxism.

What is splittism?

It means a split with Marxism-Leninism. Anyone who opposes and betrays Marxism-Leninism and undermines the basis of proletarian unity is a splitter.

It means a split with the revolutionary proletarian party. Anyone who persists in a revisionist line and turns a revolutionary proletarian party into a reformist bourgeois party is a splitter.

It means a split with the revolutionary proletariat and the broad masses of the working people. Anyone who follows a program and line running counter to the revolutionary will and fundamental interests of the proletariat and the working people is a splitter.

In brief, opportunism and revisionism are the political and ideological roots of splittism. And splittism is the organizational manifestation of opportunism and revisionism. It can

also be said that opportunism and revisionism are splittism as well as sectarianism. The revisionist are the greatest and vilest splitters and sectarians in the Communist movement.

Thirdly, the history of the international Communist movement demonstrates that proletarian unity has been consolidated and has developed through struggle against opportunism, revisionism and splittism. The struggle for unity is inseparably connected with the struggle for principle.

The unity the proletariat requires is class unity, revolutionary unity, unity against the common enemy and for the great goal of communism. The unity of the international proletariat has its theoretical and political basis in Marxism-Leninism. The international proletariat can have organizational cohesion and unity of action only when it has theoretical and political unity.

CHARGES AGAINST THE C.P.S.U.

The events of recent years show that the leaders of the C.P.S.U. headed by Khrushchev have become the chief representatives of modern revisionism as well as the greatest splitters in the international Communist movement.

Between the 20th and 22nd congresses of the C.P.S.U., the leaders of the C.P.S.U. developed a rounded system of revisionism. They put forward a revisionist line which contravenes the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, a line which consists of "peaceful coexistence," "peaceful competition," "peaceful transition," "a state of the whole people" and "a party of the entire people."

They have tried to impose this revisionist line on all fraternal parties as a substitute for the common line of the international Communist movement which was laid down at the meetings of fraternal parties in 1957 and 1960. And they have attacked anyone who perseveres in the Marxist-Leninist line and resists their revisionist line.

The leaders of the C.P.S.U. have themselves undermined the basis of the unity of the international Communist movement and created the present grave danger of a split by betray-

ing Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and pushing their revisionist and divisive line.

Far from working to consolidate and expand the Socialist camp, the leaders of the C.P.S.U. have endeavored to split and disintegrate it. They have thus made a mess of the splendid Socialist camp.

They have violated the principles guiding relations among fraternal countries as laid down in the declaration and the statement, pursued a policy of great-power chauvinism and national egoism toward fraternal Socialist countries, and thus disrupted the unity of the Socialist camp.

They have arbitrarily infringed the sovereignty of fraternal countries, interfered in their internal affairs, carried on subversive activities and striven in every way to control fraternal countries.

In the name of the "international division of labor," the leaders of the C.P.S.U. oppose the adoption by fraternal countries of the policy of building socialism by their own efforts and developing their economies on an independent basis, and attempt to turn them into economic appendages. They have tried to force those fraternal countries which are comparatively backward economically to abandon industrialization and become their sources of raw materials and markets for surplus products.

The leaders of the C.P.S.U. have openly called for the overthrow of the party and Government leaders of Albania, brashly severed all economic and diplomatic relations with her and tyrannically deprived her of her legitimate rights as a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance.

The leaders of the C.P.S.U. have violated the Chinese-Soviet treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance, made a unilateral decision to withdraw 1,390 Soviet experts working in China, to tear up 343 contracts and supplementary contracts on the employment of experts and to cancel 257 projects of scientific and technical cooperation, and pursued a restrictive and discriminatory trade policy against China. They have provoked

incidents on the Chinese-Soviet border and carried out large-scale subversive activities in Sinkiang.

On more than one occasion, Khrushchev has gone so far as to tell leading comrades of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. [Communist Party of China] that certain anti-party elements in the Chinese Communist party were his "good friends." He has praised Chinese anti-party elements for attacking the Chinese party's general line for Socialist construction, the big leap forward and the people's communes, describing their action as a "manly act."

The great-power chauvinism and splittism of the leaders of the C.P.S.U. are equally glaring in their conduct vis-à-vis fraternal parties.

Since the 20th congress of the C.P.S.U. its leaders have tried, on the pretext of "combating the personality cult," to change the leadership of other fraternal parties to conform to their will.

Contrary to the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties laid down in the declaration and the statement, the leaders of the C.P.S.U. ignore the independent and equal status of fraternal parties, insist on establishing a kind of feudal patriarchal domination over the international Communist movement and turn the relations between brother parties into those between a patriarchal father and his sons.

Khrushchev has more than once described a fraternal party as a "silly boy" and called himself its "mother." With this feudal psychology of self-exaltation, he has absolutely no sense of shame.

The leaders of the C.P.S.U. regard fraternal parties as pawns on their diplomatic chess-board.

Khrushchev plays fast and loose. He blows hot and cold. He talks one way one day and another the next, and yet he insists on the fraternal parties' dancing to his every tune without knowing whence or whither.

The leaders of the C.P.S.U. have stirred up trouble and created splits in many Communist parties by encouraging the followers of their revisionist line in these parties to

attack the leadership, or usurp leading positions, persecute Marxist-Leninists and even expel them from the party.

It is this divisive policy of the leaders of the C.P.S.U. that has given rise to organizational splits in the fraternal parties of many capitalist countries.

The leaders of the C.P.S.U. have completely reversed enemies and comrades. They have directed the edge of struggle, which should be against United States imperialism and its lackeys, against the Marxist-Leninist fraternal parties and countries.

The leaders of the C.P.S.U. are bent on seeking Soviet-United States cooperation for the domination of the world. They regard United States imperialism, the most ferocious enemy of the people of the world, as their most reliable friend, and they treat the fraternal partners and countries adhering to Marxism-Leninism as their enemy.

They collude with United States imperialism, the reactionaries of various countries, the renegade Tito clique and the right-wing Social Democrats in a partnership against the Socialist fraternal countries, the fraternal parties, the Marxist-Leninists and the revolutionary people of all countries.

When they snatch at a straw from Eisenhower or Kennedy or others like them, or think that things are going smoothly for them, the leaders of the C.P.S.U. are beside themselves with joy, hit out wildly at the fraternal parties and countries adhering to Marxism-Leninism, and endeavor to sacrifice fraternal parties and countries on the altar of their political dealings with United States imperialism.

Because the leaders of the C.P.S.U. exercise state power in a large Socialist country which exerts worldwide influence, their revisionist and divisive line has done far greater harm to the international Communist movement and the proletarian cause of world revolution than that of any of the opportunists and splitters of the past.

It can be said that the leaders of the C.P.S.U. are the greatest of all revisionists as well as the greatest of all sectarians and splitters known to history.

BOOK REVIEWS

MAO AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict. By DAVID FLOYD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964. 456 pages, bibliography and index. \$7.50 cloth; \$2.95 paper.)

David Floyd, of the London *Daily Telegraph*, has written an account of Soviet-Chinese relations since 1950. The book is divided into two parts: the first part traces the various stages of the dispute in considerable detail; the second part consists of a 230-page chronology of key events, with lengthy excerpts from significant documents and expert commentary by the author. The value of this book is greatly enhanced by the material in Part II; indeed, the material presented in that section alone sets this work apart from most generalized treatments of the Sino-Soviet rift.

According to Floyd, "the prospects of a genuine understanding being reached by the Russians and Chinese, either on matters of high ideology or on matters of immediate practical politics, are very remote. It is no longer possible to believe that the conflict between the Russian and Chinese Communists is simply a difference about the interpretation of a political doctrine or a disagreement over some particular aspect of policy. It is a dispute between two great and proud peoples about their position and power in the world."

A thoughtful, well-organized book, this contains a wealth of information and insights. Any student of Sino-Soviet relations will want to use it as an important reference source.

TWENTIETH CENTURY CHINA. By O. EDMUND CLUBB. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964. 470 pages, bibliographical note and index, \$7.95.)

O. Edmund Clubb, a former United

States foreign service officer in China, has written an excellent account of contemporary Chinese history. In lucid, interesting fashion he traces the tortured and dramatic pattern of developments from the fall of the Manchu dynasty to the rise of the Kuomintang. There are four illuminating chapters on the Chiang Kai-shek period: the Kuomintang struggle to unify China, the coming of war with Japan, the continuing breakdown of the old order, and the rising challenge from Mao's Communists are all detailed with impressive effectiveness. The final chapters treat the Communist era in China. Clubb does not think it likely that China will formally and irrevocably split the Communist world, at least not until it becomes strong enough to "go it alone."

This is an important contribution to our understanding of the forces that have shaped modern China.

TSARS, MANDARINS, AND COMMIS-SARS: A History of Chinese-Russian Relations. By HARRY SCHWARTZ. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964. 252 pages, and index, \$5.00.)

At a time when so much attention is being devoted to following and illumining the tortuous and acrimonious course of the Sino-Soviet rift, this brief survey of Chinese-Russian relations during the past several hundred years serves a useful purpose. It provides a welcome perspective and shows how the past often impinges upon the present.

The first few chapters develop the outlines of the Czarist expansionist thrust into Central Asia and the Far East; they trace the acquisition by the Russians of a Far Eastern empire at the expense of the weak and disintegrating Manchu dynasty in Peking. Subsequent sections deal with the

impact of the Bolshevik revolution on China, the development of communism in China, the Chinese struggle against Japan, and the consequences for China of World War II. The final chapters offer a clear and informative excursion through the complex and controversial sequence that has led Peking and Moscow to the brink of an open split.

STUDIES IN FRONTIER HISTORY:

Collected Papers, 1928-1958. By OWEN LATTIMORE. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1963. 565 pages, bibliography, and index, \$12.00.)

Few Westerners have traveled through Inner Asia—Sinkiang, Manchuria, Mongolia—as extensively as Owen Lattimore. An eminent authority on the frontier areas of China, he has written voluminously on these little known and seldom traversed regions. This volume offers a selection of his principal writings over a period of 30 years. There are six sections: "Section I, 'The Inner Asian Frontiers,' begins with a caravan journey which resulted in a geographical concept of Inner Asia as a region which, though divided between Chinese, Soviet, and other sovereignties, has a character of its own"; Section II deals with Sinkiang; Section III ranges over different aspects of Mongolian history, culture, and contemporary politics; Section IV analyzes the relationship between Manchuria and China; Section V, on "National Minorities," focuses on the plight of the Mongols, who have suffered exploitation at the hands of the dominant Chinese; and Section VI, on "Social History," contains articles which "go farthest in the direction of synthesizing the observations . . . of three decades." Republication of these articles is welcome.

MAO TSE-TUNG: EMPEROR OF THE BLUE ANTS. By GEORGE PALOZZI-HORVATH. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1963. 393 pages, selected bibliography, and index, \$5.75.)

This is a highly readable biography of the ruler of Communist China. The au-

thor traces Mao's early years, his involvement in the Chinese Communist party, and his early and frequent conflicts with Moscow. At times, his interpretation of Mao's behavior seems to rest more on what Mao has written than on what he has done. He notes that "the present isolation of Mao's China places her in a situation similar to that of an outlawed political party which has been forced to go underground and has to strive for the realization of its policies in illegality. By giving China scope for 'legal,' that is, normal diplomatic actions, her leaders will be faced with a choice: negotiation or the clandestine starting of 'prairie fires' in the non-white world, and in the international Communist movement." A.Z.R.

A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY. TRANSLATED AND COMPILED BY WING-TSI' CHAN. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963. 791 pages, bibliography, glossary of Chinese characters, and index, \$10.00.)

Professor Chan, distinguished authority on Chinese philosophy, put many scholars and students of China in his debt by presenting this monumental treasure-house of Chinese philosophy. Readers will see immediately that this first anthology that traces the entire history of Chinese philosophy from Confucianism to contemporary communism is of no ordinary quality. The entire collection is meticulously translated by the editor, incorporating the results of many years of research. Proper names and events are annotated, and comments are provided on important passages.

Equally important are Professor Chan's introductory remarks in each chapter. Here the reader is introduced to the significance of the selections (many selections are entire "books"), the interconnections between the various periods and between the different schools of Chinese philosophy, and the influence exerted by the writing.

Chong-Sik Lee
University of Pennsylvania

SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

(Continued from page 135)

and parties that are "subordinate" and that

nobody can decide what is and what is not correct for other countries and parties. It is up to every Marxist-Leninist party . . . to elaborate, choose and change the forms and methods of socialist construction.

The statement further asserted that the planned management of the national economy is one of the "fundamental, essential and inalienable" attributes of the sovereignty of the socialist state and "transmitting such levers to the competence of a super-state . . . would make of sovereignty an idea without any content."

What has most clearly revealed the fissile tendencies within the Communist camp is not Peking's challenge to Soviet hegemony as much as the alacrity with which Moscow's East European allies have seized the opportunity to air their own national grievances. The cold war between Russia and China has heightened Soviet dependence on its remaining allies for support and they have not failed to appreciate the increased independence and leverage it has provided them. The apparent reluctance of many Communist parties in Eastern Europe to support strongly Moscow's call for a formal excommunication of the Chinese from the world Communist movement stems less from any sympathy with the Chinese case than from a fear that any such formal rupture could lead to a reimposition by Moscow of strong centralized control over other national parties in the name of Communist discipline. On the other hand, a continuation of the existing fluid situation could serve to widen the scope of independence which many of these countries already enjoy and permit them further to assert their "national" economic interests against the supranational demands of COMECON. Khrushchev's vague reference in Budapest on April 3, 1964, to the need for "new organizational forms" that would draw closer the COMECON and Warsaw Pact countries raised visions of some modern version of the

Comintern and did little to allay the suspicions of those who see in the Sino-Soviet quarrel an opportunity to loosen, not tighten, their links with Moscow.

CHINA AND WESTERN EUROPE

(Continued from page 148)

States, while not relishing the idea of having any of her friends recognizing "two Chinas," cares still less for the idea of their having relations with only the "one" mainland China. United States pressure on her friends and allies not to recognize Peking, therefore, can be expected to become much more intense than it would have been if Peking were amenable to a "two Chinas" solution.

As a result, those nations that will follow France's example are likely to take a longer time in doing so, and still others will withhold recognition indefinitely. France is reported to have asked her former African colonies not to extend recognition as yet,²² probably hoping thereby to soften the impact of her own action upon the United States.

Without any significant rise in the number of nations recognizing Communist China, her entry into the United Nations is likely to be another few years away. In October, 1963, the vote against admission was 57 to 41, with the former French colonies, the "Brazzaville group," voting with the majority. A similar vote is likely this autumn. If the Brazzaville group switches votes in 1965 this would produce a majority in favor of Communist China's entry into the United Nations, but even then the United States will have another line of defense, namely the precedent set in 1961 when the General Assembly voted 61 to 34 to deem the China question an "important question" requiring a two-thirds majority for settlement.²³

Nevertheless, the day will come, probably in the late 1960's, when Communist China will be admitted to the United Nations. Because of Peking's insistence on being the "sole

²² See C. L. Sulzberger, "Reality and Unreality in Asia," *The New York Times*, February 15, 1964.

²³ See *The New York Times*, December 16, 1961, p. 1.

legal government" of China, this will mean the expulsion of Nationalist China from the organization. But, whereas in January, 1950, such an expulsion would have meant the abandonment of the Chinese Nationalists by the United States, in the late 1960's Taiwan is likely to find the United States a steadfast ally and defender. The Chinese Communists will therefore be able to continue to shout about "American occupation of Chinese territory"—a theme which, for reasons of their own, they wish to pursue.

CHINA AND THE U.N.

(Continued from page 155)

ing to make some concessions. In the first place, the importance of the United Nations is such that no nation can ignore it. Peking's policies show that it does not. Under these circumstances, it cannot be very acceptable to Chinese Communists to have to rely on states like Albania and Cambodia as their spokesmen. Secondly, full utilization of the political and propaganda—not to mention the economic—possibilities offered by the United Nations requires intricate and continuous maneuvering, which is difficult to achieve long distance and from the outside. Thirdly, Peking's break with Moscow has meant some isolation. While the Communist leaders bravely and defiantly assure the world that they do not care, the frequency with which they speak about the Sino-Soviet conflict indicates constant awareness, if not fear, of it. In spite of the "Self-Reliance Campaign" proclaimed at the end of 1963, Peking's determined and not unsuccessful efforts to increase political and economic contacts with the outside world, though in part motivated by imperialistic considerations, reflect a felt need. To fill such a need satisfactorily, representation in the United Nations and its agencies is almost indispensable.

There are also, on the side of the present members of the United Nations, some considerations making Peking's representation desirable. France's recognition of the Communist regime and the cryptic statement emanat-

ing from Paris that all governments recognizing Peking "always voted in favor" of seating the Communists may be a straw in the wind. The slightly unfavorable voting trend on Communist representation during the last three years is not an exact reflection of true feeling across the globe.

The long-run implications of the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting furtive attempts at rapprochement between Communist China and the non-Communist world seem important portents of a change in the representation of China at the United Nations and the role that nation is destined to play in international relations. The need for a reexamination of American policy is obvious.

ASIAN NEIGHBORS

(Continued from page 161)

Laos, and South Vietnam who in any way submit to, or join with, Peking's enemies and seek to rival or contain China's influence.

The basic obstacle to Chinese preeminence in Asia remains unchanged. The dominant powers appear to be in substantial agreement that despite her history, traditions, and vitality, resurgent China must be prevented from establishing a preeminence in Asia comparable to that obtained by the Soviet Union in East and Central Europe, or by the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

By her policies toward India and Indochina in particular, it is apparent that the present Chinese leadership does not intend passively to accept Western supremacy in the Far East again in this century—whether of Soviet or United States making. Much of China's hostility towards Russia and the United States arises from a perception of these two powers as conspiring to frustrate China's legitimate ambitions at every point. It is a view colored and shaped in Marxist-Leninist terms, but it is also basically Chinese in its feeling. For the Chinese in this century, whether Nationalist or Communist, have discovered with great bitterness that neither the Western democracies nor the Western Communist states really want the Chinese nation to be restored to greatness.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of July, 1964, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Anzus Treaty

July 17—The ministerial conference of Anzus members (Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.) opens in Washington.

July 18—The Anzus conference ends. A communiqué is issued expressing "grave concern" over Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

Disarmament

July 2—At the Geneva disarmament talks, a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Valerian A. Zorin, criticizes the multilateral nuclear fleet under Nato; he warns that the Western powers must choose between the mixed nuclear fleet and a pact to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

July 7—It is announced that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will confer privately on the procedural deadlock at the 17-nation talks; the deadlock arose over Soviet insistence that most nuclear delivery systems be eliminated at the outset of an arms pact; the U.S. has proposed a gradual reduction of weapons.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

July 29—Reliable sources report that during a secret meeting, the Ministerial Council has agreed to unite the executive divisions of the European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the Coal and Steel Community.

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

July 10—After a 2-day meeting, the E.F.T.-A.'s ministerial council issues a communiqué voicing its support for the "Kennedy round" of tariff negotiations.

Organization of African Unity

July 16—Congolese Premier Moise Tshombe reads a statement clarifying his decision not to attend the O.A.U. meeting in Cairo because of the hostility of certain African leaders.

July 17—At the opening of the O.A.U. conference in Cairo, U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser appeals for unity. Almost all the 34 member states are in attendance. U.N. Secretary-General U Thant addresses the conference.

July 21—At the final sessions, the O.A.U. members approve resolutions urging stronger economic and political pressure on Portugal and South Africa because of their racial policies. The conference selects Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as the site of a permanent secretariat for the O.A.U.; Diallo Telli of Guinea is chosen to serve as secretary-general.

Organization of American States

July 21—A consultative meeting of the foreign ministers of the O.A.S. opens in Washington to discuss Venezuelan charges that Cuba committed aggression when it smuggled 3 tons of arms into Venezuela to aid terrorists there.

July 26—The foreign ministers of 20 American states sign resolutions calling for sanctions against Cuba, condemning Cuban aggression, and advocating armed force if necessary to subdue new Cuban subversion. The sanctions include a suspension of trade and an order "not to maintain" diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba. Although all nations sign the resolution, the vote to invoke sanctions was 15-4, with Venezuela unable to vote.

United Nations

July 7—A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokes-

man discloses that his government received a memorandum yesterday from the U.S.S.R. proposing that a permanent U.N. peace force be drawn from all member states except the 5 permanent members of the Security Council. The Security Council would control the force.

July 20—U.S. Representative Adlai Stevenson and British Representative Sir Patrick Dean meet with Soviet delegate Nikolai Fedorenko on the Soviet peace force proposal.

July 28—The U.N. mission investigating Cambodian-Vietnamese border fighting reports to the Security Council; it urges the Council to appoint a U.N. mediator to bring "the two parties" together.

July 30—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, at a news conference during his Moscow trip, says he has not been able to persuade the Soviet Union to pay its share of the U.N. peace-keeping operation in the Congo.

ALGERIA

July 1—In a radio broadcast, President Ahmed Ben Bella appeals to rebels to end activities in the Aures Mountains. The revolt is headed by Colonel Mohammed Chaabani.

July 4—The Central Committee of the National Liberation Front expels 5 ranking Algerians: Mohammed Boudiaf, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Colonel Mohammed Chaabani, Mohammed Khider and Hassani Moussa.

July 8—Ben Bella announces that Colonel Chaabani has been captured.

July 13—Ben Bella announces that a second rebel chief, Commandant Moussa, has been captured. The remainder of the group of 5 who set up a "unity" committee to oust Ben Bella are at large.

BELGIUM

July 1—The Senate approves an amended Medical Reform bill agreed on by doctors and government leaders last week. Yesterday the House of Representatives approved the bill.

BRAZIL

July 17—The Congress, in joint session, approves a constitutional amendment to extend the term of President Humberto Castelo Branco for 14 months.

July 22—In its second reading, the bill to extend President Castelo Branco's term of office is passed. Also approved is an amendment requiring the president to be elected by an absolute majority.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH, THE Cyprus

July 5—U.N. mediator Sakari S. Tuomioja confers in Geneva with Cypriote Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou. U.S. President Lyndon Johnson's special representative, Dean Acheson, arrives in Geneva to talk to Tuomioja.

July 8—Lieutenant General Prem Singh Gyani, leader of the U.N. force on Cyprus, turns over command to General K. S. Thimayya.

July 10—It is reported that Greece and Turkey have landed troops secretly in Cyprus recently.

July 11—After a Turkish government spokesman confirms a secret troop build-up on Cyprus, the Cypriote cabinet meets.

July 20—It is reported that Greek Cypriotes are sending military supplies into the Troodos mountain range. Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, declares that the military build-up is necessary because of Turkey's threats to intervene.

July 22—At the U.N., Turkey formally denies having sent any forces to Cyprus except those allowed by treaty.

July 23—It is reported that U.N. Secretary-General U Thant sent a message yesterday to President Makarios decrying the lack of freedom of movement allowed the U.N. peace force.

July 30—Makarios returns to Cyprus from Greece.

Great Britain

July 8—The conference of prime ministers of

the Commonwealth opens in London. The new state of Malawi, formerly Nyasaland, is admitted to the Commonwealth; she will be the 18th member at the conference.

July 9—At the Commonwealth conference, Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta urges Britain to end white rule in Southern Rhodesia.

July 15—The Commonwealth conference closes. (See also *British Dependencies, Southern Rhodesia*.)

July 24—Government officials and the Union of Post Office Workers agree on a settlement to end the post office slowdown that has created a huge backlog of letters; workers will receive an immediate pay increase of 6.5 per cent.

July 27—British Foreign Secretary R. A. Butler arrives in the Soviet Union; he is greeted by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. (See also *Laos*.)

India

July 18—It is announced that Swaran Singh has been named Indian Minister of External Affairs. The post has been held by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who suffered a heart attack in June.

July 25—Shastri returns to work.

July 27—To alleviate the famine because of food shortages and to reduce food costs, the Indian government orders strict control of buying, selling, storing and transporting grain. The move is designed to force speculators who are hoarding grain to market it.

Malawi

July 6—The British protectorate of Nyasaland becomes independent; it will be known as Malawi.

Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda is sworn in as the prime minister of Malawi.

July 7—The Malawi parliament opens.

July 11—The new cabinet is announced.

Malaysia, Federation of

July 19—A spokesman reports that British

forces routed 50 Indonesian rebels last night along the Sarawak frontier; Sarawak is part of the Federation.

July 22—Prince Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaysia, arrives in Washington, D.C., and meets with President Johnson. At a subsequent news conference he declares that he has asked for U.S. planes and naval craft and that President Johnson has agreed to help train Malaysian troops.

July 23—In the city of Singapore, Chinese and Malays battle because of racial tensions; some 18 are reported dead. Since the racial violence erupted 2 days ago, over 1,000 persons have been arrested. Some 10,000 policemen and troops are repressing the fighting.

New Zealand

(See *Intl, Anzus*)

Nigeria

July 1—The Supreme Court affirms the treason conviction of Chief Obefemi Awolowo and 9 other opposition leaders.

Pakistan

(See *Turkey*)

BRITISH DEPENDENCIES

British Guiana

July 10—A dusk to dawn curfew is ordered for a 5-mile area, including the Anandale-Buxton area where 20 persons were killed during Negro-Indian racial fighting.

July 25—The Guiana Agricultural Workers Union decides to order striking sugar employees back to work on July 27, ending a 171-day strike.

Gambia, The

July 22—Independence talks open in London between Britain and the Gambia.

July 30—British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys tells the House of Commons that independence for the Gambia is scheduled for February 18, 1965; the talks end.

Malta

July 23—The British House of Commons approves a bill granting independence to Malta; independence is scheduled for September.

Nyasaland

(See *British Commonwealth, Malawi*)

South Arabia, Federation of

July 3—After walking out of the constitutional conference in London, Sultan Ahmed Abdullah bin Fadhli flies to Rome. He declares that the Sultanate of Fadhli has seceded from the Federation.

July 4—It is disclosed that Britain has promised to grant independence to the Federation of South Arabia by 1968. The constitutional conference on the Federation ends.

July 9—The British High Commission and the Federal Supreme Council in the Federation issue a joint statement declaring that the Sultan has acted "unconstitutionally." His return is prohibited.

Southern Rhodesia

July 15—At the Prime Ministers Commonwealth conference in London, Great Britain agrees to call a conference of white and African Southern Rhodesians to discuss independence for this self-governing colony. The Prime Ministers unanimously agree to a declaration that they will not recognize any claim to independence made by Southern Rhodesia itself.

July 16—Prime Minister of Britain, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, tells Commons that he has asked Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to come to London for talks.

Prime Minister Smith declares that he does not accept the Commonwealth conference's demands for a constitutional conference.

July 31—The Government extends for 3 months the prohibition on meetings of the People's Caretaker Council (an African nationalist group). The prohibition has been in effect since November, 1963.

CAMBODIA

(See *Intl, U.N. and Vietnam*)

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

July 9—An editorial in *Jenmin Jih Pao* (Chinese Communist party newspaper) warns that if the U.S. were to attack North Vietnam, "the Chinese people" would not sit back "with folded arms."

July 13—*Hsinhua* (Chinese Communist press agency) publishes a summary and text of an article that will appear in Red Chinese newspapers tomorrow. The article, "On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World," charges Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev with attempting "to restore capitalism" in the U.S.S.R.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

July 1—A referendum is under way in the Congo on a new constitution; the referendum is scheduled to last at least until July 10.

July 6—President Joseph Kasavubu asks former President of secessionist Katanga Province Moise Tshombe to form a transition government.

July 10—Moise Tshombe is sworn in as Premier. Eight of his 10 new ministers are also sworn in. Tshombe will be responsible for 4 cabinet posts besides the premiership: Foreign Affairs, Planning, Foreign Trade and Information.

In its first session, the Cabinet orders all political prisoners released. Godefroid Munongo is put in charge of the Interior Ministry and the Civil Service Ministry.

July 12—Munongo declares that the aim of the new government is "national reconciliation."

July 14—It is reported that rebels in North Katanga Province have made further inroads in the western sector of the province.

July 15—Premier Tshombe announces that Antoine Gizenga, leader of a leftist government in Stanleyville in 1961, has been re-

released from imprisonment. He also announces that he will not attend the O.A.U. meeting in Cairo. (See also *Intl, Organization of African Unity*.)

July 19—It is reported that rebels have seized the town of Baudouinville.

July 24—At a news conference, U.S. President Johnson declares that his administration will take an "understanding and co-operative" attitude towards the new Congo government.

CUBA

July 5—In an 18-hour, 3-day interview published in *The New York Times*, Premier Fidel Castro declares that he is willing to halt material aid to Latin American revolutionary groups if the U.S. will end material assistance for Cuban rebel exile groups intent on overthrowing his government. He urges that U.S.-Cuban trade ties be renewed.

July 6—According to a report in *The New York Times*, U.S. State Department officials reject the Castro offer. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard I. Phillips reads a statement that Cuba's "ties of dependency with the Soviet Union" and Cuban support of subversion in the Western Hemisphere "are not negotiable."

July 22—It is announced that President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado has been named Minister of the Economy, replacing Regino Boti Leon.

July 24—Latin American diplomats at the O.A.S. foreign ministers meeting in Washington report that U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk has disclosed that the U.S. has asked the Soviet Union to pressure Cuba to curb subversion in Latin America. (See also *Intl, O.A.S.*)

FRANCE

(See also *Germany*)

July 11—The head of the French Communist party for 34 years, Maurice Thorez, dies.

July 23—At his 10th news conference since he was elected President in December, 1958, Charles de Gaulle declares that the

development of the French independent nuclear force is advancing. He reiterates that the nuclear force for Europe "must be European and independent." Concerning Southeast Asia, de Gaulle declares that the Soviet Union, the U.S., France and Communist China should agree to pull out of Indochina; secondly, a large-scale economic and technical assistance program should be provided for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. He urges that the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina be reconvened to safeguard Indochina from foreign intervention.

July 28—In France, Rumanian Premier Maurer confers with President de Gaulle. (See also *Rumania*.)

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 1—The Federal Assembly, meeting in West Berlin, elects President Heinrich Lübke to a second 5-year term.

July 3—During a 2-day "working visit," French President de Gaulle and 8 Cabinet ministers arrive in Bonn to meet with Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and his ministers. Chancellor Erhard declines an invitation to establish a French-West German committee to work for greater European union.

July 4—A West German spokesman discloses that West Germany will make proposals concerning "a common European policy in the political, economic and military fields." It is reported that in effect Germany has rejected de Gaulle's plans for a European confederation. De Gaulle's party returns to Paris.

July 24—"Qualified informants" in Bonn report that earlier this month Chancellor Erhard rejected a French request for assistance in developing the French nuclear force.

July 28—A West German government spokesman, Karl Günther von Hase, announces that Chancellor Erhard and Soviet Premier Khrushchev have agreed to meet.

INDONESIA

- July 15—Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, in the Soviet Union to confer with Soviet Premier Khrushchev, declares that the U.S.S.R. has agreed to increase shipments of military equipment to Indonesia.
- July 17—A communiqué is issued at the end of week-long talks between Indonesia and the Soviet Union; the Soviet government promises full support of Indonesia's conflict with Malaysia. (See also *British Commonwealth, Malaysia*.)

IRAN(See *Turkey*)**IRAQ**

- July 14—Premier Taher Yahya announces that all private and foreign banks, insurance companies and 30 industrial and commercial businesses have been nationalized. It is also announced that an Arab Socialist Union has been established to take the place of political parties.

ISRAEL

- July 6—U.N. truce observers break up an Israeli-Syrian border fight.
- July 10—Premier Levi Eshkol returns from a 12-day visit to France.

ITALY

- July 22—Aldo Moro agrees formally to head a center-left coalition government. Moro presents his cabinet to President Antonio Segni.
- July 23—Premier Aldo Moro and his cabinet are sworn in.

JAPAN

- July 10—Premier Ikeda is elected president of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, in a close vote.
- July 17—Ikeda announces a new cabinet.
- July 18—The new cabinet is sworn in.

JORDAN

- July 6—King Hussein accepts the resignation of Premier Sherif Hussein ben Nasser; Bahjat Abdul Khadr Talhouni is asked to form a new government.

- July 7—The new cabinet under Premier Bahjat Abdul Khadr Talhouni is announced.

LAOS(See also *France*)

- July 3—Official sources in London report that Britain has rejected a Soviet proposal that Britain and the Soviet Union, as co-chairmen of the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos, jointly ask the U.S. to end its flights over Laos.
- July 16—The National Defense Ministry announces that Pathet Lao (pro-Communist) rebels have opened an offensive against Muong Soui, 90 miles north of Vientiane on the edge of the Plaine des Jarres. Muong Soui is the main base of the neutralist forces under General Kong Le. A communiqué declares the North Vietnamese forces are assisting the Pathet Lao troops.
- July 17—Western military sources report that neutralist troops and T-28 planes have stopped the Pathet Lao offensive.
- July 26—It is reported that the Soviet Union, in a message to the British government delivered yesterday, has again demanded that the 14-nation Geneva conference on Laos be reconvened. Otherwise the Soviet Union will have to reassess its role as co-chairman of the Geneva agreements.
- July 29—British Foreign Secretary R. A. Butler, meeting in Moscow with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, lists 3 conditions to be met before Britain will join with the Soviet Union in calling a 14-nation conference on Laos. The 3 conditions are reported to be a ceasefire between government and Pathet Lao forces, the withdrawal of Pathet Lao forces from territory gained in their spring offensive, and the reestablishment of the coalition government.
- July 30—The Government announces that Vietnamese forces have seized control of Route 13 from Pathet Lao rebels. For the first time in 3 years the road from Vientiane to Luang Prabang is open.

July 31—Sources in Moscow report that Butler has failed to persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its demand for an immediate 14-nation conference on Laos. It is reported that the U.S.S.R. may now withdraw as co-chairman of the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos.

MALAGASY

July 27—Malagasy President Philibert Tsiranana is welcomed upon his arrival in Washington by President Johnson, and meets with him privately.

MEXICO

July 5—Mexicans vote for a new president, Senate and House of Representatives. Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary party, is the favored presidential candidate.

July 6—Official returns so far total 700,000 votes for Diaz Ordaz and 130,000 for his only recognized opponent, José Gonzalez Torres.

NETHERLANDS, THE

July 8—In Moscow, Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph M. A. H. Luns confers with Soviet Premier Khrushchev.

POLAND

July 22—A military parade is held as Poland celebrates 20 years under a Communist regime. Attending the festivities are Soviet Premier Khrushchev, East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht, and Czech President Antonin Novotny.

PORTUGAL

July 26—President Americo de Deus Rodrigues Tomas visits Mozambique.

Portuguese Guinea

July 19—It is reported from Conakry, Guinea, that deserters from Portuguese Guinea claim rebels are in control of most of the colony.

RUMANIA

July 6—Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer arrives in the Soviet Union on a surprise visit. He is accompanied by a delegation consisting of members of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist party.

July 8—The Bucharest radio announces that Communist China and Rumania have agreed to increase scientific and technical cooperation in agriculture and in the oil, food and chemical industries, after 9 days of joint talks.

July 14—Rumanian and Soviet leaders end ideological and economic talks. A joint communiqué is issued declaring that the talks also covered Communist China, Comecon, and Soviet-Rumanian relations, and have increased "mutual understanding and friendship."

July 27—Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer and other Rumanian leaders arrive in France for a visit.

July 31—French and Rumanian leaders in Paris sign a scientific and technical cooperation pact. In a joint communiqué, Rumanian and French officials declare that friendly relations will be restored. (See also *France*.)

SOMALIA

July 13—The new government of Premier Addirizak Hagi Hussein is defeated on its first vote of confidence in the parliament.

SPAIN

July 8—Speaking at the opening of the *Cortes* (national assembly), Generalissimo Francisco Franco declares that he has given Spain a "new type of democracy."

TURKEY

July 5—At a meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in Ankara, it is announced that the 3 countries will increase technical, cultural and economic ties, cooperating outside the Central Treaty Organization (composed of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and Great Britain).

July 21—A Turkish spokesman reports that a 2-day conference of Turkish, Iranian and

Pakistani heads of state has ended; they approved a report that the 3 nations establish closer ties.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Laos*)

- July 1—Secretary-General of the French Communist party Waldeck Rochet arrives in the Soviet Union.
- July 4—Soviet Premier Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko leave Norway for home, ending a 3-week Scandinavian tour.
- July 13—Accompanied by visiting Rumanian Premier Maurer and Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, Premier Khrushchev attends a session of the Supreme Soviet. In a 3½ hour speech, Khrushchev announces that the 30 million collective farmers in the Soviet Union will receive their first old-age pensions next year; some 18 million "public service workers" (including teachers and doctors) will receive salary increases up to 40 per cent.
- July 15—The Supreme Soviet approves the nomination of Anastas I. Mikoyan as Soviet president (specifically, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet). He succeeds Leonid I. Brezhnev.
- July 18—*Tass* (official Soviet press agency) issues a statement in the name of the Soviet government accusing West Germany of following a policy of "revived . . . militarism and nazism."
- July 21—In Poland to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of Poland's Communist government, Soviet Premier Khrushchev charges that the U.S. Republican presidential candidate and his platform represent "reactionary circles."
- July 29—Khrushchev meets with U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, who is on a 4-day visit to the U.S.S.R.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See *Intl, O.A.U.*)

UNITED STATES, THE

Agriculture

- July 24—U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson

announces that U.S. farm exports reached \$6,151,000,000 for a record farm export surplus, in the fiscal year ending June 30.

Civil Rights

(See *Government and Segregation*)

Economy

- July 16—Government reports released today reveal that in the second quarter of 1964, the gross national product climbed \$10 billion to an annual rate of \$618.5 billion; personal income increased by \$11.4 billion in the March-June quarter.
- July 18—At a news conference at his ranch home near Austin, Texas, President Johnson reports that for the fiscal year ending June 30, government expenditures were \$1.1 billion less than estimated and government receipts increased by \$2.5 billion; the federal deficit was \$8.3 billion, \$3.6 billion less than estimated.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Anzus, Disarmament, and O.A.S.*)

- July 1—Secretary of State Dean Rusk declares that the U.S. hopes peace in Southeast Asia will be possible "without any extension of the fighting." (See also *Vietnam.*)
- July 4—It is reported that President Johnson has sent messages to Greek Premier George Papandreou and Turkish Premier Ismet Inonu appealing for a peaceful solution to the Cyprus situation. (See also *British Commonwealth, Cyprus.*)
- July 16—The White House announces that an informal agreement has been reached on Soviet-American cooperation in developing methods for desalting sea water.
- July 24—Meeting in Washington, 18 nations and the Vatican agree on an international arrangement whereby they will share ownership and management of a global communications satellite system. The system is being developed by the U.S., which will have the largest financial stake in the venture.

Malaysian Prime Minister Abdul Rahman ends his state visit to Washington.

At a news conference, Johnson rejects France's proposal for an Indochina conference. (See also *France*.)

July 29—President Philibert Tsiranana of Malagasy ends a 2-day state visit with President Johnson.

Government

July 1—The Senate approves Maxwell D. Taylor as ambassador to South Vietnam and U. Alexis Johnson as deputy ambassador.

July 2—President Johnson signs the Civil Rights Act of 1964 some 5 hours after the House of Representatives completes congressional approval by a vote of 289-126. Among other provisions, the bill outlaws discrimination in privately-owned public accommodations such as hotels and restaurants. (See *U.S. Government*, June 19, in the August, 1964, issue of *CURRENT HISTORY*, page 125.)

July 3—President Johnson announces that Arthur H. Dean will be appointed chairman of a National Citizens Committee for Community Relations, to help implement peaceful acceptance of the Civil Rights Act.

July 8—The White House announces a \$1.5 million federal grant will be given to the New York Mobilization for Youth, Inc. The grant will be used to help train some 2,000 youths between ages 16-21.

The Chairman of the Senate Rules Committee, B. Everett Jordan (North Carolina Democrat), files the final report on the investigation into the affairs of Robert Baker; he is found "guilty of many gross improprieties," but not of breaking the law.

July 9—President Johnson asks Congress for an additional \$29 million for research into safe pesticides.

President Johnson signs an urban transit bill for federal aid to improve bus, subway and train service for commuters.

July 10—Johnson names Manuel F. Cohen to serve as chairman of the Securities and

Exchange Commission, replacing William L. Cary. Johnson also announces that he will name Francis M. Wheat to fill a vacancy on the S.E.C. Bertrand M. Hardin is appointed acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue; he replaces Mortimer M. Caplin.

July 16—Roy M. Cohn and Murray Gottelman, on trial for perjury and obstructing justice, are acquitted.

July 20—President Johnson asks Congress to appropriate \$13 million to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Senate confirms the appointment of LeRoy Collins, former Florida governor, as director of the Community Relations Service under the Civil Rights Act.

July 24—The Senate votes to establish a 6-man bipartisan committee, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct, to investigate improper or unethical activities of Senators and Senate employees.

July 29—Johnson asks Congress for \$45.5 million to begin construction of an electric power transmission network extending from Seattle, Washington, to Phoenix, Arizona.

The Senate confirms Margaret Joy Tibbetts as ambassador to Norway.

July 30—Democratic Senator Clair Engle of California dies after an 11-month illness.

Labor

July 2—The National Labor Relations Board, in a case against an all-white local of the Independent Metal Workers Union, declares that union racial discrimination is an unfair labor practice under the Taft Hartley Act.

July 26—In Chicago, Ill., a federal jury finds the President of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, James R. Hoffa, and his 6 co-defendants guilty of misusing union pension funds.

Military

July 17—Three U.S. satellites are orbited to monitor possible nuclear explosions in space in violation of the nuclear test ban treaty.

July 20—The National Aeronautics and Space

Administration successfully fires the first payload propelled by an electrostatic rocket engine.

- July 24—At his news conference, President Johnson announces that the U.S. has successfully developed a long-range reconnaissance plane capable of flying over 2,000 miles per hour at altitudes over 80,000 feet.
- July 28—A Ranger 7 spacecraft, with 6 television cameras, is successfully launched on a flight to take pictures of the moon.
- July 31—Ranger 7 radios back to earth over 4,000 close-up photographs of the lunar surface before it crashes into the moon.

Politics

- July 12—Speaking at a caucus of Republican delegates from Florida, Senator Barry Goldwater suggests that perhaps it would be best if Alabama Governor George Wallace (Democrat) withdrew as a presidential candidate.
- July 13—The 28th Republican National Convention opens in San Francisco. Oregon Governor Mark D. Hatfield delivers the keynote address.
- July 14—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, speaking at the Republican National Convention, urges the party to condemn all extremists of the right and the left. The Republican platform is read to the delegates.
- July 15—At a session ending early this morning, Barry Goldwater's supporters defeat the 3 platform amendments on civil rights, extremism and nuclear weapons proposed by Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton and other moderate forces. The platform is approved by voice vote.

On the first ballot, the Republican National Convention nominates Barry Morris Goldwater for President of the U.S.

- July 16—The Republican National Convention nominates N. Y. Congressman William E. Miller as the vice-presidential candidate.

In his acceptance speech, Goldwater declares that "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice"; he promises to wage a strong fight to defeat communism abroad, and "collectivism" at home, if elected.

- July 17—New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller states that Goldwater's acceptance speech set forth "irresponsible" ideas.

The Republican National Committee approves Goldwater's choice for Republican National Chairman, Dean Burch of Arizona:

- July 19—Governor George C. Wallace withdraws as a candidate for President on a segregationist third party ticket.

- July 21—New York Republican Senators Kenneth Keating and Jacob K. Javits separately announce that they cannot support Barry Goldwater at this time.

- July 22—Maryland Senator J. Glenn Beall and Baltimore Mayor Theodore McKeldin announce separately that they will not support Barry Goldwater for President unless he can explain his positions on extremism and civil rights.

- July 24—In a 16-minute meeting, President Johnson and Goldwater confer; they agree that racial tensions should be avoided during the presidential campaign.

- July 29—It is announced that Rhode Island Senator John O. Pastore will deliver the keynote address at the Democratic National Convention beginning August 24.

- July 30—President Johnson states that he will not select a vice-presidential candidate to recommend to the national convention from his cabinet or from the group of officials who meet "regularly with the Cabinet."

Segregation and Civil Rights

- July 3—Following the signing yesterday of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Negroes eat in a Danville, Virginia, steak house for the first time and swim in a formerly segregated pool in Savannah, Georgia.

- July 5—In Jackson, Mississippi, 2 hotels and 1 motel accept a group of NAACP officials as guests.

- July 7—Federal District Judge Sidney C. Mize makes permanent a temporary order that 3 Mississippi school districts desegregate a grade a year beginning in September.

Governor J. Millard Tawes recalls the

- National Guard from Cambridge, Maryland, under militia rule for a year.
- July 8—On a trip to southern states to explain the Community Relations Service set up by the Civil Rights Act, Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges and Director of the C.R.S. LeRoy Collins fly to Kentucky; earlier they met in Indianapolis with 3 southern governors and the governor of Indiana.
- July 9—It is disclosed that Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation J. Edgar Hoover will fly to Mississippi tomorrow in connection with the mysterious disappearance of 3 civil rights workers, whose station wagon was found badly burned last month. Hoover will also open a new F.B.I. office in Jackson, Mississippi.
- 8 members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People end a tour of Mississippi.
- July 11—In Georgia, Lemuel A. Penn, a Negro and assistant superintendent of public schools in Washington, D.C., is shot and killed while returning from army reserve duty at Fort Benning, Georgia.
- July 12—Police in Henderson, North Carolina, use tear gas to break up some 300 white and Negro rioters in a 3-hour demonstration.
- July 13—A 3-man federal court orders Alabama Governor George C. Wallace and the State Board of Education to halt interference with any court order prohibiting segregated schools. The court also forbids state payment of tuition grants to students who attend private segregated schools.
- July 17—Some 200 Negro youths stage an orderly demonstration in New York City to protest the killing yesterday of a 15-year old Negro, James Powell, by an off-duty policeman.
- July 18—A group called Mississippians for Public Education issues an appeal for peaceful school integration in the state.
- In racial rioting in Harlem (Negro section of New York City), 1 person is killed and over 100 injured.
- July 19—At the funeral services for James Powell, anti-riot policemen repel crowds breaking through barricades, and put down other outbursts.
- July 20—Race rioting begins in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn.
- July 21—Racial violence breaks out again in Manhattan's Harlem section and the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn.
- The Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. addresses crowds in Mississippi in support of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic party; the party will try to seat a delegation at the Democratic National Convention in opposition to the regular state slate.
- President Johnson orders the F.B.I. to investigate racial disturbances in Harlem.
- July 22—In the first court test of the Civil Rights Act, a 3-judge federal panel orders the operators of a restaurant and a motel in Atlanta to desegregate their facilities by August 11.
- July 23—The F.B.I. arrests 3 white men in Greenwood, Mississippi, on charges of violating the Civil Rights Act; they are accused of beating a Negro who attended a formerly segregated movie theater.
- July 24—President Johnson declares that the F.B.I. reports on the New York City racial crisis indicate "extremist elements" are involved.
- July 25—In Rochester, New York, Negro riots that broke out last night continue into the morning. Later, rioting breaks out again when state troopers are rushed to Rochester's west side where Negroes violate the city curfew.
- July 26—Governor Rockefeller orders over 1,000 National Guardsmen into Rochester; racial violence continues for the third day.
- July 27—Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. arrives in New York for a "peace mission," invited by Mayor Wagner.
- July 29—Executive Secretary of the N.A.A.-C.P. Roy Wilkins, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference Martin Luther King, Executive Director of the National Urban League Whitney M. Young Jr. and Chairman of the Negro American Labor Council A. Philip Randolph sign a

statement urging their members to refrain from mass marches, picketing and demonstrations until after the November 3 elections; they urge civil rights forces to emphasize voting and voter registration. The statement also condemns the Republican party platform and charges that "Gold-water forces" have "injected racism into the campaign."

VATICAN, THE

July 7—The Congregation of Rites approves the canonization of 22 Africans who were killed in the nineteenth century for refusing to renounce their Catholic religion.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

July 2—Officials report that a Vietnamese army convoy has been ambushed by Vietcong guerrillas; 2 U.S. helicopters open fire to drive back the guerrillas.

July 5—A U.N. Security Council mission arrives in South Vietnam to investigate trouble along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese frontier.

July 6—South Vietnamese forces repel Vietcong guerrillas attacking a U.S. Special Forces camp at Nam Dong. Two U.S. soldiers are killed and 4 are wounded.

July 7—The new Ambassador to South Vietnam, General Maxwell D. Taylor, arrives.

July 8—U.S. Secretary-General U. Thant, in a news conference, urges that the 1954 Geneva conference be reconvened to end the war in Vietnam.

July 11—It is reported that South Vietnamese army elements have begun a major offensive against Vietcong rebels in the Plain of Reeds, some 15 miles from Saigon.

July 13—Military sources report that the Vietcong killed, wounded or captured some 200 South Vietnamese troops in a major battle at Vinh Cheo, an outpost 120 miles southwest of Saigon. Reportedly the Vietcong troops numbered over 1,000.

July 14—U.S. intelligence reports charge that officers from North Vietnam's regular army are fighting with the Vietcong rebels.

July 19—At a rally in Saigon, Premier Nguyen

Khanh urges that the war be expanded to North Vietnam.

July 21—Vietnamese students attack the French embassy in Saigon following a parade marking Vietnam's "National Day of Shame." This is the 10th anniversary of the 1954 Geneva accord, for which Vietnam blames France.

July 22—Air Commodore Nguyen Cao Ky, commander of the Air Force, confirms that Vietnamese "combat teams" have been sent to North Vietnam on sabotage missions.

July 23—Qualified sources in Saigon report that Ambassador Taylor has informed Premier Khanh that the U.S. is opposed to expanding the war to North Vietnam.

July 27—Officials in Washington disclose that the U.S. will increase its 16,000 man mission in South Vietnam by 5,000 military advisers. It is also reported by the Vietnamese government that the U.S. will send more military equipment.

YEMEN

July 11—President Abdullah al-Salal leaves for Cairo to confer with U.A.R. President Nasser.

July 13—It is announced in Cairo that the U.A.R. and Yemen have signed an agreement to coordinate economic, cultural and political ties "as a step toward complete unity." A coordinating council will be established with headquarters in Cairo.

YUGOSLAVIA

July 2—President Tito ends an 8-day visit to Poland.

July 17—The Yugoslav government announces that bread and flour prices will be raised 24 per cent; electricity by 20 per cent; coal by 10 per cent. It is also announced that workers' wages will be increased \$2.10 monthly and that family allowances will be raised.

PRINTED BY BUSINESS
PRESS, INCORPORATED



ISSUES BELOW ARE AVAILABLE FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE
INDICATE IN PROPER SPACE THE NUMBER OF EACH ISSUE WANTED

Current Issues

- ☐ North Africa (1/63)
- ☐ India (3/63)
- ☐ West Germany (4/63)
- ☐ East Europe (5/63)
- ☐ China (9/63)
- ☐ European Common Market (11/63)
- ☐ Western Africa (12/63)
- ☐ Latin America (1/64)
- ☐ South Asia (2/64)
- ☐ East Africa (3/64)
- ☐ Japan (4/64)
- ☐ Britain and the Western Alliance (5/64)

- ☐ Disarmament in Perspective (6/64)
 - ☐ Weapons Control Today (7/64)
 - ☐ The United States and Weapons Control (8/64)

- ☐ China in the World Today (9/64)

Coming Soon

- ☐ American Presidential Elections (10/64)
- ☐ The Soviet Union (11/64)
- ☐ Western Europe (12/64)

Still Available

- ☐ Africa: A New Nationalism (10/61)
- ☐ Africa South of Sahara (12/62)
- ☐ American Economy (7/60)
- ☐ American Foreign Policy and the Communist World (10/59)
- ☐ Asia and Southeast Asia (12/61)
- ☐ Asia, South and Southeast (11/62)
- ☐ China (9/62)
- ☐ Disarmament and Coexistence (5/62)
- ☐ Government and Education Abroad (6/61)
- ☐ Government and Education in the U.S. (7/61)
- ☐ Government and Labor in the U.S. (9/59)
- ☐ Middle East in Perspective (4/62)
- ☐ Problems of American Education (8/61)
- ☐ Progress in the Middle East (5/60)
- ☐ Public Power in the U.S. (5/58)
- ☐ Russia (10/62)
- ☐ Soviet Union: Programs and Policies (11/61)
- ☐ Tensions in East Central Europe (4/59)
- ☐ U.S. Military Policy and World Security (4/60)

INDIVIDUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 year, 7.75; 2 years, \$14.50; 9 months, \$6.05.

NINE MONTH GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$6.05; 5 or more, \$5.15 per sub.; 10 or more, \$4.70 per sub.; 30 or more, \$4.25 per sub.; 50 or more, \$3.80 per sub.

TWELVE MONTH GROUP SUBSCRIPTION RATES: 1 subscription, \$7.75; 5 or more, \$6.85 per sub.; 10 or more, \$6.25 per sub.; 30 or more, \$5.75 per sub.; 50 or more, \$4.95 per sub.

RATES FOR QUANTITY PURCHASE: 1 copy of a single issue, 85¢ per copy; 5 or more copies of different issues, 65¢ per copy; 5 or more of the same issue, 55¢ per copy; 10 or more of the same issue, 50¢ per copy; 30 or more of the same issue, 45¢ per copy; 100 or more of the same issue, 35¢ per copy.

CURRENT HISTORY

1822 Ludlow Street

Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.
- ☐ Please send me group subscriptions for ☐ 9 months; or ☐ 12 months.
- ☐ 1 year, \$7.75 plus 3 free issues as marked above. ☐ 2 years, \$14.50 plus 3 free issues as marked above.
- ☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me.

MR.

MISS

MRS.

ADDRESS

CITY ZONE STATE

9-64-3

These offers are good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

KEEP UP-TO-DATE

SOME OF THE THINGS *CURRENT History* OFFERS YOU

★ **AREA STUDIES** . . . Month after Month, our area studies will keep you informed and round out your background information on vital topics.

LATIN AMERICA (Jan., '64)

SOUTH ASIA (Feb., '64)

EAST AFRICA (Mar., '64)

JAPAN (Apr., '64)

BRITAIN AND THE WEST (May, '64)

CHINA (Sept., '64)

AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS (Oct., '64)

SOVIET UNION (Nov., '64)

WEST EUROPE (Dec., '64)

Subscribe now to **CURRENT HISTORY**. Exclusive and Original Studies will provide you with invaluable, factual material that you can rely on for accuracy.

Nowhere is such material duplicated. Nowhere are similar studies available at such low cost. **CURRENT HISTORY**'s continuing reference volumes are one-of-a-kind.

COORDINATED AREA STUDIES contain seven or eight articles each devoted to a pertinent topic in world affairs. Each of our contributors is a specialist in his field, who brings you his first-hand knowledge, ground, impressions. Each article in an issue focuses on a different of the subject for complete coverage of the complex problems of world.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW . . . offers a day-by-day chronological account of the important events in all the countries of the world, both large and small. This is the only monthly chronology of its kind being published in the United States.

AREA MAPS help you follow the text.

DOCUMENTS . . . Our documents section reprints the texts of important treaties, laws, diplomatic notes, speeches, to provide original source material. See how this material increases your understanding of how history is made.

BOOK REVIEWS . . . Comments on current books of interest to our readers bring you concise notes evaluating the latest publications in the social science field.

A SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY BONUS

With your subscription you will receive three free issues. Today your need for background information on the problems of our century has increased one-hundredfold. Concerned citizens everywhere are awakening to the fact that they must be prepared to meet ever-growing demands upon their insight and understanding.

3 FREE ISSUES

Your subscription to **CURRENT HISTORY** will include three coordinated studies **FREE** — chosen from our list of Available Issues (see reverse side) — plus the next 12 issues for the usual yearly subscription price. Don't forget to select your three free gift copies from our list on the other side of this cover.

← **PLEASE SEE OTHER SIDE FOR FULL DETAILS**

CH 8-64 RLH 9-3-63
CONSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS
CENTER IMPERIAL SCHLS
363 GROVE ST
PASADENA CALIF